Gerken on epistemic focal bias
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335142 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Blome-Tillmann (0000-0001-5572-643X, McGill University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages | 4202-4209 |
| Publication date | 2025-11-26 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2222950 |
| OpenAlex | W4380149559 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
According to Gerken's psychological explanation of the Bank Case data, our intuitions in the High Standards version of the Bank Case are mistaken and the result of a wider pattern of cognitive error or bias - namely, of epistemic focal bias. In this article, I challenge Gerken's view by pointing out two types of difficulties. First, that the view seems to be subject to counterexamples, and second, that the explanation favoured by Gerken overgeneralizes and is likely too fragile
Cognition · Cognitive bias · Cognitive psychology · Confirmation bias · Counterexample · Discrete mathematics · Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|