Umrao Sethi
Biographic Data
| ID | 996336 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Umrao Sethi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Umrao |
| FAMILY NAME | Sethi |
| SIGNATURE | SETHI U |
| AFFILIATIONS | Brandeis University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8895-8886 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
An Empirical Stalemate: Why Science Fails to Settle a Central Philosophical Debate About Perception
Empirical arguments in the philosophy of perception have become increasingly influential. In this paper, we evaluate the prospects for one such argument—the Argument from Structure —in light of the a priori constraint that we must give a unified account of visual experience. We argue that, correctly understood, the kinds of empirical findings marshalled in support of an internalist conclusion about color experience (or secondary quality experienc…
Perceiving Particulars
Causalists contend that you see a specific object (rather than a lookalike, or no object at all) because that object sits at the beginning of an appropriate causal chain that terminates in your visual experience. We argue that neither standard causalists nor their non‐causalist opponents can adequately accommodate a striking asymmetry between perception and thought. The asymmetry concerns the conditions under which a thought or sensory experience…
Defining sensory representation
In the paper, I argue that the notion of sensory representation that Pautz defines (via the Ramsey method) has incompatible features. The notion is defined in terms of its ability to explain both the phenomenal character of experience and its ability to give us cognitive access to perceptible properties, all while being existence-neutral. I argue that there is strong reason to conclude that no worldly relation could play all three roles simultane…
Sensible individuation
There is a straightforward view of perception that has not received adequate consideration because it requires us to rethink basic assumptions about the objects of perception. In this paper, I develop a novel account of these objects—the sensible qualities—which makes room for the straightforward view. I defend two primary claims. First, I argue that qualities like color and shape are “ontologically flexible” kinds . That is, their real definitio…
The Varieties of Instantiation
Working with the assumption that properties depend for their instantiation on substances, I argue against a unitary analysis of instantiation. On the standard view, a property is instantiated just in case there is a substance that serves as the bearer of the property. But this view cannot make sense of how properties that are mind-dependent depend for their instantiation on minds. I consider two classes of properties that philosophers often take …
Mind-Dependence in Berkeley and the Problem of Perception
On the traditional picture, accidents must inhere in substances in order to exist. Berkeley famously argues that a particular class of accidents—the sensible qualities—are mere ideas—entities that depend for their existence on minds. To defend this view, Berkeley provides us with an elegant alternative to the traditional framework: sensible qualities depend on a mind, not in virtue of inhering in it, but in virtue of being perceived by it. This m…
Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry
It is incumbent upon philosophers of mind and epistemologists alike to study the links between perceptual experience and empirical reasoning. What one thinks about the nature of perception inevitably influences one’s view of empirical reasoning (and vice versa). For philosophers like Donald Davidson (1986), who argue that experience consists in brute sensations, perception can, at best, causally impact empirical beliefs. This leads Davidson to a …
Sensible Over-Determination
I develop a view of perception that does justice to Price's intuition that all sensory experience acquaints us with sensible qualities like colour and shape. Contrary to the received opinion, I argue that we can respect this intuition while insisting that ordinary perception puts us in direct contact with the mind-independent world. In other words, Price's intuition is compatible with naïve realism. Both hallucinations and ordinary perceptions ac…
Sensible Over-Determination
I develop a view of perception that does justice to Price's intuition that all sensory experience acquaints us with sensible qualities like colour and shape. Contrary to the received opinion, I argue that we can respect this intuition while insisting that ordinary perception puts us in direct contact with the mind-independent world. In other words, Price's intuition is compatible with naïve realism. Both hallucinations and ordinary perceptions ac…
Sensible individuation
There is a straightforward view of perception that has not received adequate consideration because it requires us to rethink basic assumptions about the objects of perception. In this paper, I develop a novel account of these objects—the sensible qualities—which makes room for the straightforward view. I defend two primary claims. First, I argue that qualities like color and shape are “ontologically flexible” kinds . That is, their real definitio…
Sensible Over-Determination
I develop a view of perception that does justice to Price's intuition that all sensory experience acquaints us with sensible qualities like colour and shape. Contrary to the received opinion, I argue that we can respect this intuition while insisting that ordinary perception puts us in direct contact with the mind-independent world. In other words, Price's intuition is compatible with naïve realism. Both hallucinations and ordinary perceptions ac…
The Varieties of Instantiation
Working with the assumption that properties depend for their instantiation on substances, I argue against a unitary analysis of instantiation. On the standard view, a property is instantiated just in case there is a substance that serves as the bearer of the property. But this view cannot make sense of how properties that are mind-dependent depend for their instantiation on minds. I consider two classes of properties that philosophers often take …
Mind-Dependence in Berkeley and the Problem of Perception
On the traditional picture, accidents must inhere in substances in order to exist. Berkeley famously argues that a particular class of accidents—the sensible qualities—are mere ideas—entities that depend for their existence on minds. To defend this view, Berkeley provides us with an elegant alternative to the traditional framework: sensible qualities depend on a mind, not in virtue of inhering in it, but in virtue of being perceived by it. This m…
Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry
It is incumbent upon philosophers of mind and epistemologists alike to study the links between perceptual experience and empirical reasoning. What one thinks about the nature of perception inevitably influences one’s view of empirical reasoning (and vice versa). For philosophers like Donald Davidson (1986), who argue that experience consists in brute sensations, perception can, at best, causally impact empirical beliefs. This leads Davidson to a …
Sensible individuation
There is a straightforward view of perception that has not received adequate consideration because it requires us to rethink basic assumptions about the objects of perception. In this paper, I develop a novel account of these objects—the sensible qualities—which makes room for the straightforward view. I defend two primary claims. First, I argue that qualities like color and shape are “ontologically flexible” kinds . That is, their real definitio…
Defining sensory representation
In the paper, I argue that the notion of sensory representation that Pautz defines (via the Ramsey method) has incompatible features. The notion is defined in terms of its ability to explain both the phenomenal character of experience and its ability to give us cognitive access to perceptible properties, all while being existence-neutral. I argue that there is strong reason to conclude that no worldly relation could play all three roles simultane…
An Empirical Stalemate: Why Science Fails to Settle a Central Philosophical Debate About Perception
Empirical arguments in the philosophy of perception have become increasingly influential. In this paper, we evaluate the prospects for one such argument—the Argument from Structure —in light of the a priori constraint that we must give a unified account of visual experience. We argue that, correctly understood, the kinds of empirical findings marshalled in support of an internalist conclusion about color experience (or secondary quality experienc…
Perceiving Particulars
Causalists contend that you see a specific object (rather than a lookalike, or no object at all) because that object sits at the beginning of an appropriate causal chain that terminates in your visual experience. We argue that neither standard causalists nor their non‐causalist opponents can adequately accommodate a striking asymmetry between perception and thought. The asymmetry concerns the conditions under which a thought or sensory experience…
Perception (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Historical Philosophy and Science (3 works) · Virtue (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works)