Sensible Over-Determination

Bibliographic Data

ID4351965
AuthorsUmrao Sethi (0000-0001-8895-8886, Brandeis University, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume70
Issue280
Pages588-616
Publication date2020-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqz077
OpenAlexW2998068720
LanguageEN
Citations received15
References cited30

I develop a view of perception that does justice to Price's intuition that all sensory experience acquaints us with sensible qualities like colour and shape. Contrary to the received opinion, I argue that we can respect this intuition while insisting that ordinary perception puts us in direct contact with the mind-independent world. In other words, Price's intuition is compatible with naïve realism. Both hallucinations and ordinary perceptions acquaint us with instances of the same kinds of sensible qualities. While the instances in hallucination are mind-dependent, those in veridical perception are not. The latter are ontologically over-determined-they have their existence guaranteed both in virtue of having a material bearer and in virtue of being perceived by a mind. Such over-determined instances are mind-independent-they can continue to exist unperceived, because, in addition to the minds that perceive them, their existence is guaranteed by the material objects that are their bearers

Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Intuition · Perception · Realism · Virtue · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology · Social Psychology

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