Is Margaret Cavendish a naïve realist
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21603286 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Whiting (0000-0002-8009-6553, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts and Humanities University of Southampton Southampton UK, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 321-341 |
| Publication date | 2024-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12914 |
| OpenAlex | W4391261151 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 57 |
Perception plays a central and wide‐ranging role in the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. In this paper, I argue that Cavendish holds a naïve realist theory of perception. The case draws on what Cavendish has to say about perceptual presentation, the role of sympathy in experience, the natures of hallucination and of illusion, and the individuation of kinds. While Cavendish takes perception to have representational content, I explain how this is consistent with naïve realism. In closing, I address challenges to the interpretation, one of which turns on whether Cavendish allows for action at a distance. I argue that she does
Epistemology · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Reference and Consciousness
Perception and its Objects
The Limits of Self-Awareness
The Silence of the Senses
The Obscure Object of Hallucination
On Being Alienated
The Transparency of Experience
Stoic Sympathy
ExperiencesAn Inquiry into Some Ambiguities
Plotinus on sympatheia
XI—Perception, Vision and Causation
Margaret Cavendish on conceivability, possibility, and the case of colours
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man
Perception and Reality
Color in a Material World
Sensible Over-Determination
Margaret Cavendish on Perception, Self-Knowledge, and Probable Opinion
Ideas, Pictures, and the Directness of Perception in Descartes and Locke
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |