Daniel Whiting
Biographic Data
| ID | 953840 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Whiting |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Whiting |
| SIGNATURE | WHITING D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Southampton |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8009-6553 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 27 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 21 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Margaret cavendish on passion, pleasure, and propriety
In this paper, I present three claims belonging to Cavendish's theory of the passions. First, positive and negative passions are species of love and hate. Second, love and hate involve pleasure and pain. Third, pleasure and pain are regular and irregular, where these notions are to be understood in teleological terms. From these commitments, it follows that hate is irregular. I argue that this consequence is a problematic one for Cavendish. After…
Women on Philosophy of Art: Britain 1770–1900
Is Margaret Cavendish a naïve realist
Perception plays a central and wide‐ranging role in the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. In this paper, I argue that Cavendish holds a naïve realist theory of perception. The case draws on what Cavendish has to say about perceptual presentation, the role of sympathy in experience, the natures of hallucination and of illusion, and the individuation of kinds. While Cavendish takes perception to have representational content, I explain how this is …
Effectiveness of Violence Prevention Interventions: Umbrella Review of Research in the General Population
To address the societal harms of violence, many violence prevention interventions have been developed, tested, and implemented in the general population. These have been reported in systematic reviews and meta-analyses, which have typically focused on one type of intervention or outcome. We aimed to provide a comprehensive overview of the current evidence regarding the effectiveness of different psychosocial interventions in reducing all forms of…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Admiration, Appreciation, and Aesthetic Worth
What is aesthetic appreciation? In this paper, I approach this question in an indirection fashion. First, I introduce the Kantian notion of moral worthy action and an influential analysis of it. Next, I generalize that analysis from the moral to the aesthetic domain, and from actions to affects. Aesthetic appreciation, I suggest, consists in an aesthetically worthy affective response. After unpacking the proposal, I show that it has non-trivial i…
Higher-Order Evidence in Aesthetics
In this introduction, I explain the notion of higher-order evidence and explore its bearing on aesthetic judgement. I start by illustrating how reflection on cases involving higher-order evidence engages with well-established concerns in aesthetics-specifically, how it might reveal tensions within and between widely recognized aesthetic ideals governing aesthetic judgement. Next, I show how attention to higher-order evidence in relation to aesthe…
Margaret Macdonald on the definition of art
In this paper, I show that, in a number of publications in the early 1950s, Margaret Macdonald argues that art does not admit of definition, that art is – in the sense associated with Wittgenstein – a family resemblance concept, and that definitions of art are best understood as confused or poorly expressed contributions to art criticism. This package of views is most typically associated with a famous paper by Morris Weitz from 1956. I demonstra…
Violence and mental disorders: A structured review of associations by individual diagnoses, risk factors, and risk assessment
What masked priming effects with abbreviations can tell us about abstract letter identities
Evaluating the Clinical Impact of National Dementia Behaviour Support Programs on Neuropsychiatric Outcomes in Australia
Background/Objective: People living with dementia (PLWD) in residential aged care homes (RACHs) are frequently prescribed psychotropic medications due to the high prevalence of neuropsychiatric symptoms, also known as behaviours and psychological symptoms of dementia (BPSD). However, the gold standard to support BPSD is using psychosocial/non-pharmacological therapies. This study aims to describe and evaluate services and neuropsychiatric outcome…
Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make
What does the aesthetic ask of us? What claims do the aesthetic features of the objects and events in our environment make on us? My answer in this paper is: that depends. Aesthetic reasons can only justify feelings - they cannot demand them. A corollary of this is that there are no aesthetic obligations to feel, only permissions. However, I argue, aesthetic reasons can demand actions - they do not merely justify them. A corollary of this is that…
Epistemic Worth
Actions can have, or lack, moral worth. When a person's action is morally worthy, she not only acts rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for doing what is right. In this paper, I introduce an analogue of moral worth that applies to belief, which I call epistemic worth. When a person's belief is epistemically worthy, she not only believes rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well o…
Managing outbreaks of highly contagious diseases in prisons: A systematic review
Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
An influential proposal is that knowledge involves safe belief. A belief is safe, in the relevant sense, just in case it is true in nearby metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper, I introduce a distinct but complementary notion of safety, understood in terms of epistemically possible worlds. The main aim, in doing so, is to add to the epistemologist’s tool-kit. To demonstrate the usefulness of the tool, I use it to advance and assess substa…
Normativity
What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. This division of labour corresponds to a distinction theorists draw between practical and epistemic normativity, where normativity is a matter of what one should or may do or think, what one has reason or justification to do or to think, what it is right or wrong to do or to think, and so on. Philosophers have tended…
Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
In a tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, it has become common for contemporary philosophers to treat practical and theoretical normativity as constituting two genuinely distinct domains. Despite this, it remains unclear what it is, or would be, for practical and theoretical normativity to in fact be distinct domains. This chapter considers the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct and proposes that there are two differen…
The Glass is Half Empty: A New Argument for Pessimism about Aesthetic Testimony
Call the view that it is possible to acquire aesthetic knowledge via testimony, optimism, and its denial, pessimism. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for pessimism. It works by turning attention away from the basis of the relevant belief, namely, testimony, and toward what that belief in turn provides a basis for, namely, other attitudes. In short, I argue that an aesthetic belief acquired via testimony cannot provide a rational basis for …
Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori
Objective reasons are given by the facts. Subjective reasons are given by one’s perspective on the facts. Subjective reasons, not objective reasons, determine what it is rational to do. In this paper, I argue against a prominent account of subjective reasons. The problem with that account, I suggest, is that it makes what one has subjective reason to do, and hence what it is rational to do, turn on matters outside or independent of one’s perspect…
The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations - Duncan Pritchard et al
Pritchard, Millar and Haddock, in their distinct and distinctive contributions to this book, examine the nature of knowledge in general and of certain species of knowledge, as well as the value of knowledge and of other epistemic standings. The contributions do not draw upon one another and differ greatly in substance and style. Those looking to the volume for a unified vision or sustained dialogue will be disappointed. However, that disappointme…
Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content - Anandi Hattiangadi
The normativity of meaning defended
Journal Article The normativity of meaning defended Get access Daniel Whiting Daniel Whiting University of ReadingReading RG6 6AA, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 67, Issue 2, April 2007, Pages 133–140, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/67.2.133 Published: 01 April 2007
Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make
What does the aesthetic ask of us? What claims do the aesthetic features of the objects and events in our environment make on us? My answer in this paper is: that depends. Aesthetic reasons can only justify feelings - they cannot demand them. A corollary of this is that there are no aesthetic obligations to feel, only permissions. However, I argue, aesthetic reasons can demand actions - they do not merely justify them. A corollary of this is that…
The Glass is Half Empty: A New Argument for Pessimism about Aesthetic Testimony
Call the view that it is possible to acquire aesthetic knowledge via testimony, optimism, and its denial, pessimism. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for pessimism. It works by turning attention away from the basis of the relevant belief, namely, testimony, and toward what that belief in turn provides a basis for, namely, other attitudes. In short, I argue that an aesthetic belief acquired via testimony cannot provide a rational basis for …
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
An influential proposal is that knowledge involves safe belief. A belief is safe, in the relevant sense, just in case it is true in nearby metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper, I introduce a distinct but complementary notion of safety, understood in terms of epistemically possible worlds. The main aim, in doing so, is to add to the epistemologist’s tool-kit. To demonstrate the usefulness of the tool, I use it to advance and assess substa…
Higher-Order Evidence in Aesthetics
In this introduction, I explain the notion of higher-order evidence and explore its bearing on aesthetic judgement. I start by illustrating how reflection on cases involving higher-order evidence engages with well-established concerns in aesthetics-specifically, how it might reveal tensions within and between widely recognized aesthetic ideals governing aesthetic judgement. Next, I show how attention to higher-order evidence in relation to aesthe…
The normativity of meaning defended
Journal Article The normativity of meaning defended Get access Daniel Whiting Daniel Whiting University of ReadingReading RG6 6AA, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 67, Issue 2, April 2007, Pages 133–140, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/67.2.133 Published: 01 April 2007
Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content - Anandi Hattiangadi
The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations - Duncan Pritchard et al
Pritchard, Millar and Haddock, in their distinct and distinctive contributions to this book, examine the nature of knowledge in general and of certain species of knowledge, as well as the value of knowledge and of other epistemic standings. The contributions do not draw upon one another and differ greatly in substance and style. Those looking to the volume for a unified vision or sustained dialogue will be disappointed. However, that disappointme…
Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori
Objective reasons are given by the facts. Subjective reasons are given by one’s perspective on the facts. Subjective reasons, not objective reasons, determine what it is rational to do. In this paper, I argue against a prominent account of subjective reasons. The problem with that account, I suggest, is that it makes what one has subjective reason to do, and hence what it is rational to do, turn on matters outside or independent of one’s perspect…
The Glass is Half Empty: A New Argument for Pessimism about Aesthetic Testimony
Call the view that it is possible to acquire aesthetic knowledge via testimony, optimism, and its denial, pessimism. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for pessimism. It works by turning attention away from the basis of the relevant belief, namely, testimony, and toward what that belief in turn provides a basis for, namely, other attitudes. In short, I argue that an aesthetic belief acquired via testimony cannot provide a rational basis for …
Normativity
What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. This division of labour corresponds to a distinction theorists draw between practical and epistemic normativity, where normativity is a matter of what one should or may do or think, what one has reason or justification to do or to think, what it is right or wrong to do or to think, and so on. Philosophers have tended…
Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
In a tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, it has become common for contemporary philosophers to treat practical and theoretical normativity as constituting two genuinely distinct domains. Despite this, it remains unclear what it is, or would be, for practical and theoretical normativity to in fact be distinct domains. This chapter considers the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct and proposes that there are two differen…
Epistemic Worth
Actions can have, or lack, moral worth. When a person's action is morally worthy, she not only acts rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for doing what is right. In this paper, I introduce an analogue of moral worth that applies to belief, which I call epistemic worth. When a person's belief is epistemically worthy, she not only believes rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well o…
Managing outbreaks of highly contagious diseases in prisons: A systematic review
Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
An influential proposal is that knowledge involves safe belief. A belief is safe, in the relevant sense, just in case it is true in nearby metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper, I introduce a distinct but complementary notion of safety, understood in terms of epistemically possible worlds. The main aim, in doing so, is to add to the epistemologist’s tool-kit. To demonstrate the usefulness of the tool, I use it to advance and assess substa…
Violence and mental disorders: A structured review of associations by individual diagnoses, risk factors, and risk assessment
What masked priming effects with abbreviations can tell us about abstract letter identities
Evaluating the Clinical Impact of National Dementia Behaviour Support Programs on Neuropsychiatric Outcomes in Australia
Background/Objective: People living with dementia (PLWD) in residential aged care homes (RACHs) are frequently prescribed psychotropic medications due to the high prevalence of neuropsychiatric symptoms, also known as behaviours and psychological symptoms of dementia (BPSD). However, the gold standard to support BPSD is using psychosocial/non-pharmacological therapies. This study aims to describe and evaluate services and neuropsychiatric outcome…
Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make
What does the aesthetic ask of us? What claims do the aesthetic features of the objects and events in our environment make on us? My answer in this paper is: that depends. Aesthetic reasons can only justify feelings - they cannot demand them. A corollary of this is that there are no aesthetic obligations to feel, only permissions. However, I argue, aesthetic reasons can demand actions - they do not merely justify them. A corollary of this is that…
Margaret Macdonald on the definition of art
In this paper, I show that, in a number of publications in the early 1950s, Margaret Macdonald argues that art does not admit of definition, that art is – in the sense associated with Wittgenstein – a family resemblance concept, and that definitions of art are best understood as confused or poorly expressed contributions to art criticism. This package of views is most typically associated with a famous paper by Morris Weitz from 1956. I demonstra…
Admiration, Appreciation, and Aesthetic Worth
What is aesthetic appreciation? In this paper, I approach this question in an indirection fashion. First, I introduce the Kantian notion of moral worthy action and an influential analysis of it. Next, I generalize that analysis from the moral to the aesthetic domain, and from actions to affects. Aesthetic appreciation, I suggest, consists in an aesthetically worthy affective response. After unpacking the proposal, I show that it has non-trivial i…
Higher-Order Evidence in Aesthetics
In this introduction, I explain the notion of higher-order evidence and explore its bearing on aesthetic judgement. I start by illustrating how reflection on cases involving higher-order evidence engages with well-established concerns in aesthetics-specifically, how it might reveal tensions within and between widely recognized aesthetic ideals governing aesthetic judgement. Next, I show how attention to higher-order evidence in relation to aesthe…
Is Margaret Cavendish a naïve realist
Perception plays a central and wide‐ranging role in the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. In this paper, I argue that Cavendish holds a naïve realist theory of perception. The case draws on what Cavendish has to say about perceptual presentation, the role of sympathy in experience, the natures of hallucination and of illusion, and the individuation of kinds. While Cavendish takes perception to have representational content, I explain how this is …
Effectiveness of Violence Prevention Interventions: Umbrella Review of Research in the General Population
To address the societal harms of violence, many violence prevention interventions have been developed, tested, and implemented in the general population. These have been reported in systematic reviews and meta-analyses, which have typically focused on one type of intervention or outcome. We aimed to provide a comprehensive overview of the current evidence regarding the effectiveness of different psychosocial interventions in reducing all forms of…
What’s the Point of Authors
In this paper, I want to start to untangle some of the philosophical issues associated with our practices of ascribing authorship for collaborative work, with an eye to formulating better guidelines for authorship. I will focus on the following questions: 1. What epistemic, social, and ethical functions are played by our practices of ascribing authorship for academic papers? 2. What ways of ascribing authorship would best address these functions?…
Margaret cavendish on passion, pleasure, and propriety
In this paper, I present three claims belonging to Cavendish's theory of the passions. First, positive and negative passions are species of love and hate. Second, love and hate involve pleasure and pain. Third, pleasure and pain are regular and irregular, where these notions are to be understood in teleological terms. From these commitments, it follows that hate is irregular. I argue that this consequence is a problematic one for Cavendish. After…
Women on Philosophy of Art: Britain 1770–1900
Philosophy (15 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Psychology (11 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Aesthetics (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works)