Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make

Bibliographic Data

ID4762269
AuthorsDaniel Whiting (0000-0002-8009-6553, University of Southampton, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume71
Issue2
Pages407-427
Publication date2021-03-18
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaa045
OpenAlexW3034057615
LanguageEN
Citations received15
References cited59

What does the aesthetic ask of us? What claims do the aesthetic features of the objects and events in our environment make on us? My answer in this paper is: that depends. Aesthetic reasons can only justify feelings - they cannot demand them. A corollary of this is that there are no aesthetic obligations to feel, only permissions. However, I argue, aesthetic reasons can demand actions - they do not merely justify them. A corollary of this is that there are aesthetic obligations to act, not only permissions. So, I conclude, the aesthetic asks little of us as patients and much of as agents

Aesthetic experience · Aesthetics · Corollary · Feeling · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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