Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4754522 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonas Olson (0000-0001-8323-9882, Uppsala University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 215 |
| Pages | 295-300 |
| Publication date | 2004-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00353.x |
| OpenAlex | W2163143613 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 35 |
| References cited | 3 |
Journal Article Buck‐Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Get access Jonas Olson Jonas Olson Uppsala University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 54, Issue 215, April 2004, Pages 295–300, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00353.x Published: 17 May 2004
Epistemology · Physics · Volume (thermodynamics) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem
Reasons, Values and Agent-Relativity
Reasons First
Justice and Retaliation
The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way
Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason
The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons
Reasons as explanations
Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value
Why I’m still a proportionalist
Subjectivism and the Framework of Constitutive Grounds
G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons
Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality
How Final and Non-Final Valuing Differ
In opposition to alethic views of moral responsibility
The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value
Moral uncertainty, noncognitivism, and the multi‐objective story
Hutcheson's Contributions to Action Theory
Consequentialism and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
Pass the Buck to Reasons for What? On How to Characterise the Response Component of the Buck‐Passing Analysis of Value
The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility
Neosentimentalism and Environmental Ethics
Why Environmental Philosophers Should Be "Buck-Passers" about Value
Exercising Doxastic Freedom
Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons
Desire and Goodness
A Humean explanation of acting on normative reasons
The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons
Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons
The right and the wrong kind of reasons
Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make
Teoria do valor
A Field Guide to Social Construction
Buck-Passing Accounts of Value
Fittingness, Value, and Trans-World Attitudes
| Unique citing works | 35 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,75 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 35 |