Buck-Passing Accounts of Value

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4079211
AutoresJussi Suikkanen (0000-0002-2804-1280)
Año2009
Volumen4
Número5
Páginas768-779
Fecha de publicación2009-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00253.x
OpenAlexW2050332310
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas16
Referencias citadas20

This paper explores the so-called buck-passing accounts of value. These views attempt to use normative notions, such asreasonsandoughtto explain evaluative notions, such asgoodnessandvalue. Thus, according to Scanlon's well-known view, the property of being good is the formal, higher-order property of having some more basic properties that provide reasons to have certain kind of valuing attitudes towards the objects. I begin by tracing some of the long history of such accounts. I then describe the arguments which are typically used to motivate these views. The rest of this article investigates how some of the central details of the buck-passing accounts should be specified, and what kind of problems these views face

Economics · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept · Normative · Order (exchange · Property (philosophy · Rest (music · Social science · Sociology · Tracing · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy