The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8080681
AutoresAndrés G Garcia (0000-0002-7472-5456, autor de correspondencia)
Año2018
Volumen47
Número3
Páginas681-692
Fecha de publicación2018-08-30
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaphiloSOPHIA (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 2155-0905 • E-ISSN: 2155-0891
EditorialSpringer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1007/s11406-018-0019-1
OpenAlexW2888948714
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas35

Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes

Argument (complex analysis · Economics · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Positive economics · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy