Actions That We Ought, But Can't

Bibliographic Data

ID8115237
AuthorsAlex King (0000-0001-6323-0872, Brown University Department of Philosophy Box 1918 Providence RI 02912, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume27
Issue3
Pages316-327
Publication date2013-12-18
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueRatio (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-0006 • E-ISSN: 1467-9329
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/rati.12043
OpenAlexW1690925423
LanguageEN
Citations received16

It is commonly assumed that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, that is, that if we ought to do something, then it must be the case that we can do it. It is a frequent quip about this thesis that any account must specify three things: what is meant by the ‘ought’, what is meant by the ‘implies’, and what is meant by the ‘can’. Something is missed, though, when we state the thesis in its shortened, three‐word form. We overlook what it means to do something . It is, I think, not mere coincidence that nobody has discussed this issue: It is very difficult to specify what it means to do something in the relevant sense. This paper is devoted to fleshing out one way of doing something that is a problem for the thesis

Epistemology · Metaphysics · nobody · State (computer science · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub