Dubious pleasures
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9467166 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Javier González De Prado Salas (0000-0003-2020-058X, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, corresponding author), Javier González de Prado (UNED , Spain) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 217-234 |
| Publication date | 2022-03-21 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal of Aesthetics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0904 • E-ISSN: 1468-2842 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/aesthj/ayac021 |
| OpenAlex | W4226114983 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 44 |
My aim is to discuss the impact of higher-order evidence on aesthetic appreciation. I suggest that this impact is different with respect to aesthetic beliefs and to aesthetic affective attitudes (such as enjoyment). More specifically, I defend the view that higher-order evidence questioning the reliability of one’s aesthetic beliefs can make it reasonable for one to revise those beliefs. Conversely, in line with a plausible account of emotions, aesthetic affective attitudes are not directly sensitive to this type of higher-order evidence; they are sensitive only to those features of objects that make such attitudes (un)fitting. Thus, I argue, there are cases of non-defective recalcitrant aesthetic attitudes where the subject has both a non-defective, fitting aesthetic affective attitude and a reasonable belief questioning the fittingness of this attitude. I further discuss whether, in this type of case, the subject has decisive reasons to try to change her recalcitrant attitudes—say by trying to modify her aesthetic affective dispositions. My answer is negative. Even granting that subjects always have aesthetic reasons to try to avoid aesthetically unfitting attitudes, these can be outweighed by further reasons not to do so—perhaps including aesthetic reasons related to the construction of valuable aesthetic identities or to the value of aesthetic engagement
Aesthetic experience · Aesthetic value · Aesthetics · Order (exchange · Subject (documents · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
The Rationality of Perception
Normative Externalism
Emotions, Values, and Agency
The Importance of Being Rational
Seeing What to Do
Reasons
Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness
The Game of Belief
Epistemology of Disagreement
An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism
Higher‐Order Evidence 1
The Moralistic Fallacy
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat
On Liking Aesthetic Value
The Vices of Perception
Dispossessing Defeat
Aesthetic practices and normativity
Virtue, Vice, and Value
Emotional Reason
The right and the wrong kind of reasons
Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make
The Vice of Snobbery
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |