Dana Kay Nelkin
Biographic Data
| ID | 996394 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dana Kay Nelkin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dana Kay |
| FAMILY NAME | Nelkin |
| SIGNATURE | NELKIN D K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California San Diego |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6563-1709 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 55 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Beyond killing one to save five: Sensitivity to ratio and probability in moral judgment
A great deal of current research on moral judgments centers on moral dilemmas concerning tradeoffs between one and five lives. Whether one considers killing one innocent person to save five others to be morally required or impermissible has been taken to determine whether one is appealing to consequentialist or non-consequentialist reasoning. But this focus on tradeoffs between one and five may obscure more nuanced commitments involved in moral d…
Forgiveness and Letting Go: Ways of Changing the Normative Landscape
Forgiveness is often distinguished from other ways of eliminating (or reducing) blame, such as letting go. In this paper, I focus on a conception of forgiveness as normative landscape change (alteration of the rights and obligations of relevant parties), and explore the distinction between forgiveness-understood in this way-and letting go. I highlight the explanatory power of this approach for distinguishing forgiveness and letting go, and contra…
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Chapters address the nature of moral responsibility—whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame …
Liability, culpability, and luck
This paper focuses on the role of culpability in determining the degree of liability to defensive harm, and asks whether there are any restrictions on when culpability is relevant to liability. A natural first suggestion is that it is only relevant (or at least is significantly enhanced) when combined with an actual threat of harm in the situation in which defensive harm becomes salient as a means of protection. The paper begins by considering th…
Sensitivity to shifts in probability of harm and benefit in moral dilemmas
Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions
What is to forgive someone? Is it primarily a change in one’s emotions, in one’s behavior, or something else? What is the connection between forgiveness and blaming attitudes like resentment? What is the relationship between forgiveness and free will? The chapters in this book explore not only these questions about the nature of forgiveness but also questions about the norms of forgiveness. Is forgiveness necessarily gift-like, and thus always di…
Responsibility and Ignorance of the Self
Précis of Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility
Replies to Critics
The Immediate and Delayed Cardiovascular Benefits of Forgiving
BACKGROUND: The putative health benefits of forgiveness may include long-term buffering against cardiovascular reactivity associated with rumination. Although studies show short-term benefits of adopting a forgiving perspective, it is uncertain whether this perspective protects against repeated future rumination on offenses, which may be necessary for long-term health benefits. Also unclear is whether forgiveness offers unique benefits beyond sim…
Three Cheers for Double Effect
The doctrine of double effect, together with other moral principles that appeal to the intentions of moral agents, has come under attack from many directions in recent years, as have a variety of rationales that have been given in favor of it. In this paper, our aim is to develop, defend, and provide a new theoretical rationale for a secular version of the doctrine. Following Quinn (1989), we distinguish between Harmful Direct Agency and Harmful …
The Sense of Freedom, or Acting under the Idea of Freedom
This chapter continues the inquiry into our commitments as rational deliberators. An argument is presented for the conclusion that we must presuppose that we are free agents in deliberating in the sense that our actions are up to us in such a way that we are responsible for them. The very nature of rational deliberation—of seeking reasons with a view to adopting and acting on the best (or at least good) ones — is such as to manifest a commitment …
Making sense of freedom and responsibility
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame
Book Review| October 01 2011 Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame Scanlon, T. M., Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008. xii +247 pp. Dana Nelkin Dana Nelkin Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 603–607. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1334532 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Vide…
The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality
The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality
Research Article| July 01 2000 The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality Dana K. Nelkin Dana K. Nelkin Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 373–408. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-373 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Dana K. Nelkin; The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2000; 109 (3): 373–…
The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality
Research Article| July 01 2000 The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality Dana K. Nelkin Dana K. Nelkin Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 373–408. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-373 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Dana K. Nelkin; The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2000; 109 (3): 373–…
Three Cheers for Double Effect
The doctrine of double effect, together with other moral principles that appeal to the intentions of moral agents, has come under attack from many directions in recent years, as have a variety of rationales that have been given in favor of it. In this paper, our aim is to develop, defend, and provide a new theoretical rationale for a secular version of the doctrine. Following Quinn (1989), we distinguish between Harmful Direct Agency and Harmful …
The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality
Forgiveness and Letting Go: Ways of Changing the Normative Landscape
Forgiveness is often distinguished from other ways of eliminating (or reducing) blame, such as letting go. In this paper, I focus on a conception of forgiveness as normative landscape change (alteration of the rights and obligations of relevant parties), and explore the distinction between forgiveness-understood in this way-and letting go. I highlight the explanatory power of this approach for distinguishing forgiveness and letting go, and contra…
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame
Book Review| October 01 2011 Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame Scanlon, T. M., Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008. xii +247 pp. Dana Nelkin Dana Nelkin Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 603–607. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1334532 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Vide…
The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality
The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality
Research Article| July 01 2000 The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality Dana K. Nelkin Dana K. Nelkin Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 373–408. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-373 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Dana K. Nelkin; The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2000; 109 (3): 373–…
The Sense of Freedom, or Acting under the Idea of Freedom
This chapter continues the inquiry into our commitments as rational deliberators. An argument is presented for the conclusion that we must presuppose that we are free agents in deliberating in the sense that our actions are up to us in such a way that we are responsible for them. The very nature of rational deliberation—of seeking reasons with a view to adopting and acting on the best (or at least good) ones — is such as to manifest a commitment …
Making sense of freedom and responsibility
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame
Book Review| October 01 2011 Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame Scanlon, T. M., Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008. xii +247 pp. Dana Nelkin Dana Nelkin Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 603–607. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1334532 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Vide…
The Immediate and Delayed Cardiovascular Benefits of Forgiving
BACKGROUND: The putative health benefits of forgiveness may include long-term buffering against cardiovascular reactivity associated with rumination. Although studies show short-term benefits of adopting a forgiving perspective, it is uncertain whether this perspective protects against repeated future rumination on offenses, which may be necessary for long-term health benefits. Also unclear is whether forgiveness offers unique benefits beyond sim…
Three Cheers for Double Effect
The doctrine of double effect, together with other moral principles that appeal to the intentions of moral agents, has come under attack from many directions in recent years, as have a variety of rationales that have been given in favor of it. In this paper, our aim is to develop, defend, and provide a new theoretical rationale for a secular version of the doctrine. Following Quinn (1989), we distinguish between Harmful Direct Agency and Harmful …
Précis of Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility
Replies to Critics
Responsibility and Ignorance of the Self
Liability, culpability, and luck
This paper focuses on the role of culpability in determining the degree of liability to defensive harm, and asks whether there are any restrictions on when culpability is relevant to liability. A natural first suggestion is that it is only relevant (or at least is significantly enhanced) when combined with an actual threat of harm in the situation in which defensive harm becomes salient as a means of protection. The paper begins by considering th…
Sensitivity to shifts in probability of harm and benefit in moral dilemmas
Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions
What is to forgive someone? Is it primarily a change in one’s emotions, in one’s behavior, or something else? What is the connection between forgiveness and blaming attitudes like resentment? What is the relationship between forgiveness and free will? The chapters in this book explore not only these questions about the nature of forgiveness but also questions about the norms of forgiveness. Is forgiveness necessarily gift-like, and thus always di…
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Chapters address the nature of moral responsibility—whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame …
Beyond killing one to save five: Sensitivity to ratio and probability in moral judgment
A great deal of current research on moral judgments centers on moral dilemmas concerning tradeoffs between one and five lives. Whether one considers killing one innocent person to save five others to be morally required or impermissible has been taken to determine whether one is appealing to consequentialist or non-consequentialist reasoning. But this focus on tradeoffs between one and five may obscure more nuanced commitments involved in moral d…
Forgiveness and Letting Go: Ways of Changing the Normative Landscape
Forgiveness is often distinguished from other ways of eliminating (or reducing) blame, such as letting go. In this paper, I focus on a conception of forgiveness as normative landscape change (alteration of the rights and obligations of relevant parties), and explore the distinction between forgiveness-understood in this way-and letting go. I highlight the explanatory power of this approach for distinguishing forgiveness and letting go, and contra…
Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Social Psychology (8 works) · Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (5 works) · Blame (4 works)