The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10697669 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dana Kay Nelkin (0000-0001-6563-1709, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 109 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 373-408 |
| Publication date | 2000-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-109-3-373 |
| OpenAlex | W2108583517 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 71 |
| References cited | 13 |
Research Article| July 01 2000 The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality Dana K. Nelkin Dana K. Nelkin Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 373–408. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-373 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Dana K. Nelkin; The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2000; 109 (3): 373–408. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-373 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2000 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content
Citation · Download · Epistemology · Icon · Information retrieval · Lottery · Rationality · World Wide Web · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
Reasons First
Knowledge As Acceptable Testimony
Against Knowledge Closure
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Belief, credence, and norms
What Good are Counterexamples?
Probabilistic Proofs, Lottery Propositions, and Mathematical Knowledge
Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules
Justification and the knowledge-connection
Inference strength predicts the probability of conditionals better than conditional probability does
Why It Is Not Unreasonable to Fear Terrorism
The Hardest Paradox for Closure
A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism
Legal Standards of Proof
Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment
The Epistemic Insignificance of Moral Encroachment
Is it ever rational to hold inconsistent beliefs
Akratic (epistemic) modesty
Rational requirements for suspended judgment
Disinformation is for degrading the value of information, not confirming falsehoods
Credence and belief
The normality of error
Merely statistical evidence
What is rational belief
Counterfactual Contamination
Epistemic Justification
Should Effective Altruists Always Maximize Expected Value
Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes
Belief, credence, and faith
Normalcy, Understanding and the Problem of Statistical Evidence
Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence
Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe
Coherence and Deontology
Risky belief
Degrees of Assertability
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality
Justified Judging
Assertion and its Constitutive Norms
Being More Realistic About Reasons
Knowledge, Justification and Normative Coincidence 1
Evidence and Inference
A modal theory of justification
Context-sensitivity and the Preface Paradox for credence
Cut-off points for the rational believer
Warrant without truth
A bitter pill for closure
Rational understanding
What should we believe about the future
Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance
Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry
Belief, credence, and evidence
Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do
Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
On the principle of intention agglomeration
Getting a little closure for closure
Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability
Two accounts of assertion
Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety
Lotteries, knowledge, and inconsistent belief
A normatively adequate credal reductivism
Relevance and risk
Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law
Fricker on testimonial justification
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces
A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability
Coherence and Knowability
Fallibilism
Epistemic akrasia and treacherous propositions
| Unique citing works | 71 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,96 |
| Citation span | 2002 - 2026 (25) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 71 |