Epistemic akrasia and treacherous propositions

Bibliographic Data

ID4351875
AuthorsBar Luzon (0000-0001-8729-9639, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, corresponding author)
Year2025
Publication date2025-01-20
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaf002
OpenAlexW4406598884
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited26

I argue that one ought not be epistemically akratic. Although this position may look self-evident, it is hard to pin down exactly what's wrong with the akratic subject. Indeed, some philosophers argue that epistemic akrasia is permissible. The standard anti-akratic response focuses on the weird downstream implications of this state for action and assertion. This approach, however, is unsatisfactory, since it fails to explain the epistemic impermissibility of epistemic akrasia. Here, I argue that epistemic akrasia is impermissible on a purely epistemic basis. Doing so brings out the connection between positive epistemic statuses and truth: it is that connection that explains the fundamental impermissibility of epistemic akrasia

Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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