Heather Battaly
Biographic Data
| ID | 998719 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Heather Battaly |
| GIVEN NAMES | Heather |
| FAMILY NAME | Battaly |
| SIGNATURE | BATTALY H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Connecticut |
| ORCID | 0009-0005-4011-6248 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 21 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 70 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 18 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 3 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Fundamentalist Persons
This essay offers a definition of fundamentalists. It argues that fundamentalists are people who reject, return, and replace (RRR). They reject and replace extant ideals, returning (or taking themselves to return) to ideals that are more ‘pure’ or ‘authentic’ to the past. There are three key implications of this definition. First, fundamentalism can but needn’t be religious or political: RRR includes religious and political fundamentalism, but al…
Humility in Practices of Transitional Justice
Building on the limitations-owning view of intellectual humility, this essay argues that performing acts of humility in carrying out practices of transitional justice requires the owning of grave wrongs and limitations. The opening section explains the limitations-owning analysis of humility. Section 2 argues that one can perform illocutionary acts of acknowledging and apologizing for grave wrongs and limitations without owning them. The closing …
Virtue Signaling Without Vanity
Measuring and mismeasuring the self
This article evaluates Alessandra Tanesini’s analyses of the intellectual virtues and vices of self-assessment, as characterized in her book The Mismeasure of the Self (2021 Tanesini, A. 2021. The Mismeasure of the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). Section 1 explains Tanesini’s rich accounts of the virtues of intellectual humility and pride. Contra Tanesini, section 2 suggests an alternative account according t…
Too much of a good thing
Recent studies have suggested that intellectual humility (IH) might facilitate (a) better learning outcomes, (b) more scientific mindedness, and (c) better peer and professional relationships. However, recent philosophical work has raised concerns that too much IH might lead to intellectual servility (IS), and thus might be vicious (albeit not blameworthy) rather than virtuous. We define IS as a disposition to over-own one’s intellectual limitati…
Can fanaticism be a liberatory virtue
Solidarity
Solidarity is distinctively collective virtue is a virtue of a collective (or group) for which there is no individual analog; that is, there is no corresponding virtue V of individuals, from which the collective version of V could be derived. Political Solidarity, that: “one cannot be in solidarity with oneself”. This chapter is exploratory in spirit. It brings virtue theory to bear on some key accounts of political solidarity, flagging several p…
Access denied
Educating for intellectual pride and ameliorating servility in contexts of epistemic injustice
Some of the students in our classrooms doubt their intellectual strengths—their knowledge, abilities, and skills. They may be unaware of the intellectual strengths they have, or may ignore, lack confidence in, or under-estimate them. They may even incorrectly judge themselves to be intellectually inferior to their peers. Students who do such things consistently are deficient in the virtue of intellectual pride—in appropriately ‘owning’ their inte…
Countering Servility through Pride and Humility
This article argues that an interlocutor’s deference and open-mindedness can indicate servility rather than virtuous humility. Section 1 evaluates an influential philosophical analysis of the virtue of humility and two psychological measures, all of which emphasize the contrast between humility and arrogance. Section 2 develops a philosophical analysis of servility, building on the limitations-owning view. It argues that servility is an unwilling…
Enough Suffering
Vice Epistemology
The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology
The majority of virtue theorists have taken their cue from Aristotle. This chapter argues that plausible theory in John Stuart Mill and Julia Driver's work— a theory. It outlines a consequentialist account of epistemic virtue. That account will then be put to use in defining the virtue that is the main object of study: the epistemic virtue of deference. The chapter looks at what informed sources can do to bring about deference, and thereby instil…
A Third Kind of Intellectual Virtue
This chapter argues that we need a third analysis of intellectual virtue: personalism (Battaly 2016a, 2017; Battaly and Slote 2016; Slote and Battaly 2018). Personalism contends that intellectual virtues are personal dispositions, rather than sub-personal ones. Personalism allows for the possibility that an individual might have had little or no control over which character traits she came to possess, and thus might not be praiseworthy (or blamew…
Developing virtue and rehabilitating vice
Aristotelian virtue theorists have emphasized the role of the self in developing virtue and in rehabilitating vice. But this article argues that, as Aristotelians, we have placed too much emphasis on self-cultivation and self-reform. Self-cultivation is not required for developing virtue or vice. Nor will sophia-inspired self-reform jumpstart change in the vicious person. In each case, the external environment has an important role to play. One c…
Intellectual Humility
Detecting Epistemic Vice in Higher Education Policy
Journal Article Detecting Epistemic Vice in Higher Education Policy: Epistemic Insensibility in the Seven Solutions and the REF Get access Heather Battaly Heather Battaly Correspondence: Heather Battaly, Philosophy Department, California State University Fullerton, 800 N State College Blvd, Fullerton, CA, 92834-6868, USA. Email: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Philosophy o…
Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge
Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic
Epistemic Self‐Indulgence
This chapter contains sections titled: Aristotle on Moral Temperance, Self-Indulgence, and Insensibility Epistemic Temperance, Self-Indulgence, and Insensibility Acknowledgments References
Virtue Epistemology
What are the qualities of an excellent thinker? A growing new field, virtue epistemology, answers this question.Section Idistinguishes virtue epistemology from belief-based epistemology.Section IIexplains the two primary accounts of intellectual virtue: virtue-reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism. Virtue-reliabilists claim that the virtues are stable reliable faculties, like vision. Virtue-responsibilists claim that they are acquired character t…
Intellectual Humility
Virtue Epistemology
What are the qualities of an excellent thinker? A growing new field, virtue epistemology, answers this question.Section Idistinguishes virtue epistemology from belief-based epistemology.Section IIexplains the two primary accounts of intellectual virtue: virtue-reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism. Virtue-reliabilists claim that the virtues are stable reliable faculties, like vision. Virtue-responsibilists claim that they are acquired character t…
Detecting Epistemic Vice in Higher Education Policy
Journal Article Detecting Epistemic Vice in Higher Education Policy: Epistemic Insensibility in the Seven Solutions and the REF Get access Heather Battaly Heather Battaly Correspondence: Heather Battaly, Philosophy Department, California State University Fullerton, 800 N State College Blvd, Fullerton, CA, 92834-6868, USA. Email: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Philosophy o…
Developing virtue and rehabilitating vice
Aristotelian virtue theorists have emphasized the role of the self in developing virtue and in rehabilitating vice. But this article argues that, as Aristotelians, we have placed too much emphasis on self-cultivation and self-reform. Self-cultivation is not required for developing virtue or vice. Nor will sophia-inspired self-reform jumpstart change in the vicious person. In each case, the external environment has an important role to play. One c…
Can fanaticism be a liberatory virtue
Access denied
Virtue Epistemology
What are the qualities of an excellent thinker? A growing new field, virtue epistemology, answers this question.Section Idistinguishes virtue epistemology from belief-based epistemology.Section IIexplains the two primary accounts of intellectual virtue: virtue-reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism. Virtue-reliabilists claim that the virtues are stable reliable faculties, like vision. Virtue-responsibilists claim that they are acquired character t…
Epistemic Self‐Indulgence
This chapter contains sections titled: Aristotle on Moral Temperance, Self-Indulgence, and Insensibility Epistemic Temperance, Self-Indulgence, and Insensibility Acknowledgments References
Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic
Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge
Detecting Epistemic Vice in Higher Education Policy
Journal Article Detecting Epistemic Vice in Higher Education Policy: Epistemic Insensibility in the Seven Solutions and the REF Get access Heather Battaly Heather Battaly Correspondence: Heather Battaly, Philosophy Department, California State University Fullerton, 800 N State College Blvd, Fullerton, CA, 92834-6868, USA. Email: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Philosophy o…
Intellectual Humility
Developing virtue and rehabilitating vice
Aristotelian virtue theorists have emphasized the role of the self in developing virtue and in rehabilitating vice. But this article argues that, as Aristotelians, we have placed too much emphasis on self-cultivation and self-reform. Self-cultivation is not required for developing virtue or vice. Nor will sophia-inspired self-reform jumpstart change in the vicious person. In each case, the external environment has an important role to play. One c…
The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology
The majority of virtue theorists have taken their cue from Aristotle. This chapter argues that plausible theory in John Stuart Mill and Julia Driver's work— a theory. It outlines a consequentialist account of epistemic virtue. That account will then be put to use in defining the virtue that is the main object of study: the epistemic virtue of deference. The chapter looks at what informed sources can do to bring about deference, and thereby instil…
A Third Kind of Intellectual Virtue
This chapter argues that we need a third analysis of intellectual virtue: personalism (Battaly 2016a, 2017; Battaly and Slote 2016; Slote and Battaly 2018). Personalism contends that intellectual virtues are personal dispositions, rather than sub-personal ones. Personalism allows for the possibility that an individual might have had little or no control over which character traits she came to possess, and thus might not be praiseworthy (or blamew…
Vice Epistemology
Countering Servility through Pride and Humility
This article argues that an interlocutor’s deference and open-mindedness can indicate servility rather than virtuous humility. Section 1 evaluates an influential philosophical analysis of the virtue of humility and two psychological measures, all of which emphasize the contrast between humility and arrogance. Section 2 develops a philosophical analysis of servility, building on the limitations-owning view. It argues that servility is an unwilling…
Enough Suffering
Solidarity
Solidarity is distinctively collective virtue is a virtue of a collective (or group) for which there is no individual analog; that is, there is no corresponding virtue V of individuals, from which the collective version of V could be derived. Political Solidarity, that: “one cannot be in solidarity with oneself”. This chapter is exploratory in spirit. It brings virtue theory to bear on some key accounts of political solidarity, flagging several p…
Access denied
Educating for intellectual pride and ameliorating servility in contexts of epistemic injustice
Some of the students in our classrooms doubt their intellectual strengths—their knowledge, abilities, and skills. They may be unaware of the intellectual strengths they have, or may ignore, lack confidence in, or under-estimate them. They may even incorrectly judge themselves to be intellectually inferior to their peers. Students who do such things consistently are deficient in the virtue of intellectual pride—in appropriately ‘owning’ their inte…
Too much of a good thing
Recent studies have suggested that intellectual humility (IH) might facilitate (a) better learning outcomes, (b) more scientific mindedness, and (c) better peer and professional relationships. However, recent philosophical work has raised concerns that too much IH might lead to intellectual servility (IS), and thus might be vicious (albeit not blameworthy) rather than virtuous. We define IS as a disposition to over-own one’s intellectual limitati…
Can fanaticism be a liberatory virtue
Measuring and mismeasuring the self
This article evaluates Alessandra Tanesini’s analyses of the intellectual virtues and vices of self-assessment, as characterized in her book The Mismeasure of the Self (2021 Tanesini, A. 2021. The Mismeasure of the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). Section 1 explains Tanesini’s rich accounts of the virtues of intellectual humility and pride. Contra Tanesini, section 2 suggests an alternative account according t…
Humility in Practices of Transitional Justice
Building on the limitations-owning view of intellectual humility, this essay argues that performing acts of humility in carrying out practices of transitional justice requires the owning of grave wrongs and limitations. The opening section explains the limitations-owning analysis of humility. Section 2 argues that one can perform illocutionary acts of acknowledging and apologizing for grave wrongs and limitations without owning them. The closing …
Virtue Signaling Without Vanity
Fundamentalist Persons
This essay offers a definition of fundamentalists. It argues that fundamentalists are people who reject, return, and replace (RRR). They reject and replace extant ideals, returning (or taking themselves to return) to ideals that are more ‘pure’ or ‘authentic’ to the past. There are three key implications of this definition. First, fundamentalism can but needn’t be religious or political: RRR includes religious and political fundamentalism, but al…
Philosophy (17 works) · Epistemology (15 works) · Psychology (11 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 works) · Sociology (10 works) · Virtue (9 works) · Law (6 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Humility (5 works)