Jesper Kallestrup
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1044906 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Jesper Kallestrup |
| PRENOMES | Jesper |
| SOBRENOME | Kallestrup |
| ASSINATURA | KALLESTRUP J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Edinburgh |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3445-8509 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 20 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 27 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 17 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 4 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2006 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
A Causal Exclusion Problem for Knowledge-First Epistemology
According to knowledge-first epistemology, knowledge is irreducible to true belief plus something else, and yet knowledge entails belief. Moreover, knowledge plays an ineliminable role in causal explanation of action. This paper develops and defends an entirely new line of reasoning against this view: in conjunction with two independently plausible principles about explanatory realism and causal exclusion, this view leads to the conclusion that b…
Virtuous Deferral
Virtue epistemology has long struggled with the “Creditability Dilemma”: how can knowledge gained through deference be creditable to the knower if it primarily depends on others’ cognitive work? We propose a novel solution by developing a telic account of doxastic deference as a distinctive kind of social‐epistemic performance. On our view, such deference succeeds when a deferrer forms a true belief that p in domain d , which answers their query,…
When do groups have evidence
What is it for a proposition p to be part of an agent’s (S) evidence? Some place a doxastic constraint such that p is part of S’s evidence if and only if S at least justifiably believes that p. That raises a problem when S is a group in that if justified group belief is under voluntary control, as some inflationists maintain, groups can ignore or fabricate evidence for illegitimate reasons, and thus conveniently avoid blame for not acting on thei…
Knowledge-Qua in Groups
Deflationism about group knowledge is the view that a group has knowledge if and only if most of its members have that knowledge. The case against deflationism has revolved around epistemic divergence arguments, which typically aim to show that members’ knowledge isn’t necessary for group knowledge. This paper is instead devoted to objections against members’ knowledge being sufficient for group knowledge. Focusing on structured groups in which m…
Digitally extended knowledge
The hypothesis of extended cognition says that cognitive processes and mental states extend to include extra-organismic parts of the external world, provided certain conditions on cognitive integration are satisfied. Moreover, if knowledge is assumed to be a mental state, knowledge is, by a similar line of reasoning, equally extended. However, extended knowledge presents an additional challenge to do with cognitive bloat, given that knowledge is …
The myth of true lies
Suppose you assert a proposition p that you falsely believe to be false with the intention to deceive your audience. The standard view has it that you lied. This paper argues against orthodoxy: deceptive lying requires that p be in actual fact false, in addition to your intention to deceive by means of untruthfully asserting that p . We proceed as follows. First, an argument is developed for such falsity condition as the non‐psychological compone…
Group virtue epistemology
The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust
According to a strong assurance view of testimonial trust, a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p . While the strong view offers a genuinely inter‐personal account of testimony, it faces a problem about bootstrapping: how can trust generate epistemic reasons when trust can obtain between unreliable speakers and hearers? In contrast, a weaker assurance view holds that a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason…
Socially Extended Epistemology
The present volume explores the topic of socially extended knowledge. This is a topic of research at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The core idea of socially extended epistemology is that epistemic states such as beliefs, justification, and knowledge can be collectively realized by groups or communities of individuals. Typical examples that are being studied in the literature include collective memo…
Extended Epistemology
One of the most important research programs in contemporary cognitive science is that of extended cognition. In this area of study, features of a subject’s cognitive environment can, in certain conditions, become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. The aim of this volume is to explore the epistemological ramifications of this idea. The book brings together papers written by a range of distinguished and emerging academics, from a va…
Extended Knowledge, the Recognition Heuristic, and Epistemic Injustice
This chapter argues that the interaction of biased media coverage and widespread employment of the recognition heuristic can produce epistemic injustices. It explains the recognition heuristic as studied by Gigerenzer and colleagues, highlighting how some of its components are largely external to the cognitive agent. Having connected the recognition heuristic with recent work on the hypotheses of embedded, extended, and scaffolded cognition, it a…
Socially Extended Epistemology
Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory
The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended‐memory cases’ (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition ( HEC ) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended‐memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is …
New Waves in Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of mind is one of the core disciplines in philosophy. The questions that it deals with are profound, vexed and intriguing. This volume of 15 new cutting-edge essays gives young researchers
The epistemology of absence-based inference
Bootstrap and rollback
Conceivability, rigidity and counterpossibles
Knowledge‐ wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge
Call knowledge where so‐and‐so, knowledge who so‐and‐so, etc., knowledge‐wh . The reductive view says that knowledge‐ wh reduces to the two‐place knowledge relation Ksp. Schaffer (2007) argues that this view has no viable response to the problem of convergent knowledge: how can a knowing‐ wh ascription be reduced to a Ksp ascription if a second knowing‐ wh ascription intuitively inequivalent to the first can be reduced to the same Ksp ascription?…
Being Reduced
Is the mind nothing but neural firings in the brain? Are we just a bunch of neurons? If the mind is just the brain, then how can we act as genuine, responsible agents in the world? 'Being Reduced' attempts to understand these questions
Three Strands in Kripke's Argument against the Identity Theory
Kripke's argument against the identity theory in the philosophy of mind runs as follows. Suppose some psychophysical identity statement S is true. Then S would seem to be contingent at least in the sense that S seems possibly false. And given that seeming contingency entails genuine contingency when it comes to such statements S is contingent. But S is necessary if true. So S is false. This entry considers responses to each of the three premises.…
Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities
Group virtue epistemology
Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory
The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended‐memory cases’ (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition ( HEC ) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended‐memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is …
Knowledge‐ wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge
Call knowledge where so‐and‐so, knowledge who so‐and‐so, etc., knowledge‐wh . The reductive view says that knowledge‐ wh reduces to the two‐place knowledge relation Ksp. Schaffer (2007) argues that this view has no viable response to the problem of convergent knowledge: how can a knowing‐ wh ascription be reduced to a Ksp ascription if a second knowing‐ wh ascription intuitively inequivalent to the first can be reduced to the same Ksp ascription?…
Conceivability, rigidity and counterpossibles
The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust
According to a strong assurance view of testimonial trust, a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p . While the strong view offers a genuinely inter‐personal account of testimony, it faces a problem about bootstrapping: how can trust generate epistemic reasons when trust can obtain between unreliable speakers and hearers? In contrast, a weaker assurance view holds that a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason…
The epistemology of absence-based inference
Bootstrap and rollback
Being Reduced
Is the mind nothing but neural firings in the brain? Are we just a bunch of neurons? If the mind is just the brain, then how can we act as genuine, responsible agents in the world? 'Being Reduced' attempts to understand these questions
Three Strands in Kripke's Argument against the Identity Theory
Kripke's argument against the identity theory in the philosophy of mind runs as follows. Suppose some psychophysical identity statement S is true. Then S would seem to be contingent at least in the sense that S seems possibly false. And given that seeming contingency entails genuine contingency when it comes to such statements S is contingent. But S is necessary if true. So S is false. This entry considers responses to each of the three premises.…
Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities
Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities
Being Reduced
Is the mind nothing but neural firings in the brain? Are we just a bunch of neurons? If the mind is just the brain, then how can we act as genuine, responsible agents in the world? 'Being Reduced' attempts to understand these questions
Three Strands in Kripke's Argument against the Identity Theory
Kripke's argument against the identity theory in the philosophy of mind runs as follows. Suppose some psychophysical identity statement S is true. Then S would seem to be contingent at least in the sense that S seems possibly false. And given that seeming contingency entails genuine contingency when it comes to such statements S is contingent. But S is necessary if true. So S is false. This entry considers responses to each of the three premises.…
Conceivability, rigidity and counterpossibles
Knowledge‐ wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge
Call knowledge where so‐and‐so, knowledge who so‐and‐so, etc., knowledge‐wh . The reductive view says that knowledge‐ wh reduces to the two‐place knowledge relation Ksp. Schaffer (2007) argues that this view has no viable response to the problem of convergent knowledge: how can a knowing‐ wh ascription be reduced to a Ksp ascription if a second knowing‐ wh ascription intuitively inequivalent to the first can be reduced to the same Ksp ascription?…
Bootstrap and rollback
The epistemology of absence-based inference
New Waves in Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of mind is one of the core disciplines in philosophy. The questions that it deals with are profound, vexed and intriguing. This volume of 15 new cutting-edge essays gives young researchers
Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory
The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended‐memory cases’ (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition ( HEC ) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended‐memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is …
Socially Extended Epistemology
The present volume explores the topic of socially extended knowledge. This is a topic of research at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The core idea of socially extended epistemology is that epistemic states such as beliefs, justification, and knowledge can be collectively realized by groups or communities of individuals. Typical examples that are being studied in the literature include collective memo…
Extended Epistemology
One of the most important research programs in contemporary cognitive science is that of extended cognition. In this area of study, features of a subject’s cognitive environment can, in certain conditions, become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. The aim of this volume is to explore the epistemological ramifications of this idea. The book brings together papers written by a range of distinguished and emerging academics, from a va…
Extended Knowledge, the Recognition Heuristic, and Epistemic Injustice
This chapter argues that the interaction of biased media coverage and widespread employment of the recognition heuristic can produce epistemic injustices. It explains the recognition heuristic as studied by Gigerenzer and colleagues, highlighting how some of its components are largely external to the cognitive agent. Having connected the recognition heuristic with recent work on the hypotheses of embedded, extended, and scaffolded cognition, it a…
Socially Extended Epistemology
The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust
According to a strong assurance view of testimonial trust, a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason for the hearer to believe p . While the strong view offers a genuinely inter‐personal account of testimony, it faces a problem about bootstrapping: how can trust generate epistemic reasons when trust can obtain between unreliable speakers and hearers? In contrast, a weaker assurance view holds that a speaker's assurance that p grounds a reason…
Group virtue epistemology
The myth of true lies
Suppose you assert a proposition p that you falsely believe to be false with the intention to deceive your audience. The standard view has it that you lied. This paper argues against orthodoxy: deceptive lying requires that p be in actual fact false, in addition to your intention to deceive by means of untruthfully asserting that p . We proceed as follows. First, an argument is developed for such falsity condition as the non‐psychological compone…
Digitally extended knowledge
The hypothesis of extended cognition says that cognitive processes and mental states extend to include extra-organismic parts of the external world, provided certain conditions on cognitive integration are satisfied. Moreover, if knowledge is assumed to be a mental state, knowledge is, by a similar line of reasoning, equally extended. However, extended knowledge presents an additional challenge to do with cognitive bloat, given that knowledge is …
Knowledge-Qua in Groups
Deflationism about group knowledge is the view that a group has knowledge if and only if most of its members have that knowledge. The case against deflationism has revolved around epistemic divergence arguments, which typically aim to show that members’ knowledge isn’t necessary for group knowledge. This paper is instead devoted to objections against members’ knowledge being sufficient for group knowledge. Focusing on structured groups in which m…
A Causal Exclusion Problem for Knowledge-First Epistemology
According to knowledge-first epistemology, knowledge is irreducible to true belief plus something else, and yet knowledge entails belief. Moreover, knowledge plays an ineliminable role in causal explanation of action. This paper develops and defends an entirely new line of reasoning against this view: in conjunction with two independently plausible principles about explanatory realism and causal exclusion, this view leads to the conclusion that b…
Virtuous Deferral
Virtue epistemology has long struggled with the “Creditability Dilemma”: how can knowledge gained through deference be creditable to the knower if it primarily depends on others’ cognitive work? We propose a novel solution by developing a telic account of doxastic deference as a distinctive kind of social‐epistemic performance. On our view, such deference succeeds when a deferrer forms a true belief that p in domain d , which answers their query,…
When do groups have evidence
What is it for a proposition p to be part of an agent’s (S) evidence? Some place a doxastic constraint such that p is part of S’s evidence if and only if S at least justifiably believes that p. That raises a problem when S is a group in that if justified group belief is under voluntary control, as some inflationists maintain, groups can ignore or fabricate evidence for illegitimate reasons, and thus conveniently avoid blame for not acting on thei…
Epistemology (17 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (16 obras) · Philosophy (16 obras) · Computer Science (9 obras) · Psychology (9 obras) · Metaphysics (8 obras) · Philosophy of science (8 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 obras) · Sociology (7 obras) · Philosophy of language (6 obras)