The myth of true lies

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20141869
AutoresJesper Kallestrup (0000-0002-3445-8509, University of Aberdeen—Philosophy Aberdeen Scotland, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Volume89
Fascículo4
Páginas451-466
Data de publicação2023-08-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12466
OpenAlexW4377137841
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas49

Suppose you assert a proposition p that you falsely believe to be false with the intention to deceive your audience. The standard view has it that you lied. This paper argues against orthodoxy: deceptive lying requires that p be in actual fact false, in addition to your intention to deceive by means of untruthfully asserting that p . We proceed as follows. First, an argument is developed for such falsity condition as the non‐psychological component of lying. The problem with the standard view, we profess, is exactly that lying is a purely psychological relation between disbelief, assertion, and intention. Then, by scrutinising familiar cases, we revisit the alleged intuitive support for the existence of true lies. It turns out these intuitions can be explained away once we reflect on the characteristic deceptive hallmarks that are associated with the distinction between lying and botched attempts at lying. Finally, we examine the morality of lying in the light of said falsity condition. The resultant view emphasises our moral sensitivity to the practical consequences of acts of lying, while still accommodating those moral considerations that pertain exclusively to the psychological components of lying

Argument (complex analysis) · Assertion · Deception · Epistemology · Falsity · Lying · Morality · Orthodoxy · Theology · Computer Science · Deception detection and forensic psychology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology