The folk concept of lying

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4079795
AutoresAlex Wiegmann (0000-0002-1492-9780, Ruhr University Bochum, autor correspondente), Jörg Meibauer (0000-0002-0909-9487, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz)
Ano2019
Volume14
Fascículo8
Data de publicação2019-08-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12620
OpenAlexW2964968685
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas18
Referências citadas45

Lying is a familiar and important concept for virtually all of us, and philosophers have written a lot about what it means to lie. Although it is commonly accepted that an adequate definition of lying captures people's use and understanding of this concept, there have been surprisingly few empirical studies on it. n recent years, however, there is a trend emerging to remedy this lacuna. In this paper, we provide an overview of these studies. Starting from a widely accepted philosophical definition of lying, we focus on the following three questions: Is an intention to deceive required for lying? Is it possible to lie despite saying something true? Can you lie by falsely implicating

Deception · Epistemology · Lie detection · Lying · Physics · Deception detection and forensic psychology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology