Amie L Thomasson
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1045308 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Amie L Thomasson |
| PRENOMES | Amie L |
| SOBRENOME | Thomasson |
| ASSINATURA | THOMASSON A L |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Miami |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6621-5931 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 31 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 120 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 31 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1996 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 6 |
Metaethics and the Functions of Moral Language
Metaethics has long included debates about the function of moral discourse. Some have argued that moral statements express our attitudes, others that they serve as prescriptions for how to act, still others that they describe moral facts or properties. This article argues that we can best address these questions about function by attending to work in empirical linguistics. Tracing the development of moral language through different grammatical fo…
Precis for rethinking metaphysics
This book aims to change how we think about metaphysics, what it can do, and why it matters. Traditionally, metaphysics has been presented as aiming to discover deep truths about the world. But this leads to a rivalry with science, epistemological mystery, and a despairing skepticism about how we can gain knowledge in metaphysics. Rethinking Metaphysics (2025) diagnoses the problems with many prior approaches to metaphysics as arising from a prob…
Conceptual engineering
This paper addresses several foundational questions in conceptual engineering: When is conceptual engineering needed? When we engage in conceptual engineering, should we think of ourselves primarily as aiming to change concepts or language – and how should we think of either of those? Finally, how is implementing the changes recommended by conceptual engineering possible? I begin by outlining a number of different sorts of circumstances in which …
How should we think about linguistic function
Talk of the functions of language or concepts plays a central role in developing an appealing pragmatic approach to conceptual engineering. But some have expressed skepticism that we can make any good sense of the idea of function as applied to concepts or language, or argued that the most we can say is that the function of ‘F’ is to refer to the Fs. In this paper, however, I argue that identifying linguistic functions is not hopeless, and that w…
Norms and necessity
The critics in this volume raise several important challenges to the modal normativist position developed in Norms and Necessity, including whether the relation I claim holds between semantic rules and necessity claims generates spurious claims of metaphysical necessity, whether the view is circular (implicitly relying on a more 'robust' form of modal realism), and whether it conflicts with truth-conditional semantics. They also raise probing que…
Precis of Amie L. Thomasson, norms and necessity
Claims about what is necessary or possible play a central role in debates in metaphysics and elsewhere in philosophy. But how can we understand such claims, and how can we come to know which are true? Modal discourse has long presented formidable ontological, epistemological, and methodological problems - problems that arise or are exacerbated by assuming that modal talk aims to describe or track special features of this world, or other possible …
Prospects for a Quietist Moral Realism
Quietist Moral Realists accept that there are moral facts and properties, while aiming to avoid many of the explanatory burdens thought to fall on traditional moral realists. This chapter examines the forms that Quietist Moral Realism has taken and the challenges it has faced, in order to better assess its prospects. The best hope, this chapter argues, lies in a pragmatist approach that distinguishes the different functions of diverse areas of di…
How can we come to know metaphysical modal truths
What Do Easy Inferences Get Us
In Ontology Made Easy (2015), I defend the idea that there are ‘easy’ inferences that begin from uncontroversial premises and end with answers to disputed ontological questions. But what do easy inferences really get us? Bueno and Cumpa (this journal, 2020) argue that easy inferences don’t tell us about the natures of properties —they don’t tell us what properties are . Moreover, they argue, by accepting an ontologically neutral quantifier we can…
A Pragmatic Method for Normative Conceptual Work
How ought we to do work in conceptual ethics? Some have thought that conceptual choice should itself be guided by (heavyweight) metaphysics—for we should be sure that our concepts pick out things that exist or should aim to choose concepts that really ‘carve the world at its joints’. An alternative is to take a pragmatic approach to conceptual ethics. But pragmatic approaches are often criticized as unable to account for intuitions that some conc…
Replies to Comments on Ontology Made Easy
I'd like to begin by thanking Katherine Hawley, Daniel Korman and Stephen Schiffer for their extremely interesting and insightful comments, which very much enrich the discussion. I am both honored and grateful that such fine philosophers would spend their time and careful attention on my work. Since there doesn't seem to be significant overlap across their concerns, I will simply respond to each in turn
The ontology of social groups
Précis of Ontology Made Easy
Interdisciplinary Introduction to Categorization
This interview provides the answers of three prominent categorisation scholars to the same set of seven questions they were sent. These questions should be seen as «naïve », in the sense that they were aimed to be as intuitive and disciplinary-independent as possible. This has been done in order to allow contrasting answers to emerge. Amie Thomasson is professor in philosophy at the University of Miami, Dvora Yanow has hold a « strategic chair » …
What can philosophy really do?
Deflationism in Semantics and Metaphysics
Various forms of deflationism have been defended in various arenas. On the semantic side, there is deflationism about truth, reference, and meaning, all of which are popular, perhaps even orthodox. On the metaphysical side, there is deflationism about existence, and meta‐ontological deflationism about ontological debates. Unlike their semantic counterparts, these views have gone unnoticed or been widely attacked. The purpose of this chapter is to…
The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects
The basic philosophical controversy regarding ordinary objects is: Do tables and chairs, sticks and stones, exist? This paper aims to do two things: first, to explain why how this can be a controversy at all, and second, to explain why this controversy has arisen so late in the history of philosophy. Section 1 begins by discussing why the ‘obvious’ sensory evidence in favor of ordinary objects is not taken to be decisive. It goes on to review the…
Social Entities
The social sciences study social entities, including social facts, social actions, and social objects. Social entities seem to differ from merely natural objects like sticks and stones in an important respect, however: they are, in some sense, human constructions and would not exist without human habits, practices, beliefs, and/or agreements. Social facts, as Durkheim observed, have “coercive power, by virtue of which they impose themselves” on h…
Ordinary Objects
Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for parsimony or for a non-arbitrary answer to the special composition question; others arise from prohibitions against causal redundancy, ontological vagueness, or colocation; and others still come from worries that a common sense ontology would be a riv…
Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics
Artifacts and Human Concepts
It is frequently observed that artifacts and other social and cultural objects are in some sense ‘creations of the mind’, depending in certain ways on human beliefs or activities. But in what sense are such objects and kinds dependent on human concepts and intentions? And what difference does this make to the place of such objects in our philosophical theories?
Real Natures and Familiar Objects
Metaphysical Arguments Against Ordinary Objects
Several prominent attacks on the objects of ‘folk ontology’ argue that these would be omitted from a scientific ontology, or would be ‘rivals’ of scientific objects for their claims to be efficacious, occupy space, be composed of parts, or possess a range of other properties. I examine causal redundancy and over determination arguments, ‘nothing over and above’ appeals, and arguments based on problems with collocation and with property additivity…
Debates about the Ontology of Art
Philosophers have placed some or all works of art in nearly every available ontological category, with some considering them to be physical objects, others abstract structures, imaginary entities, action types or tokens, and so on. How can we decide which among these views to accept? I argue that the rules of use for sortal terms like "painting" and "symphony" establish what ontological sorts of thing we are referring to with those terms, so that…
Realism and Human Kinds
It is often noted that institutional objects and artifacts depend on human beliefs and intentions and so fail to meet the realist paradigm of mind‐independent objects. In this paper I draw out exactly in what ways the thesis of mind‐independence fails, and show that it has some surprising consequences. For the specific forms of mind‐dependence involved entail that we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own institutional a…
Realism and Human Kinds
It is often noted that institutional objects and artifacts depend on human beliefs and intentions and so fail to meet the realist paradigm of mind‐independent objects. In this paper I draw out exactly in what ways the thesis of mind‐independence fails, and show that it has some surprising consequences. For the specific forms of mind‐dependence involved entail that we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own institutional a…
Foundations for a Social Ontology
Fictional Characters and Literary Practices
I argue that the ontological status of fictional characters is determined by the beliefs and practices of those who competently deal with works of literature, and draw out three important consequences of this. First, heavily revisionary theories cannot be considered as ‘discoveries’ about the ‘true nature’ of fictional characters; any acceptable realist theory of fiction must preserve all or most of the common conception of fictional characters. …
The ontology of social groups
Debates about the Ontology of Art
Philosophers have placed some or all works of art in nearly every available ontological category, with some considering them to be physical objects, others abstract structures, imaginary entities, action types or tokens, and so on. How can we decide which among these views to accept? I argue that the rules of use for sortal terms like "painting" and "symphony" establish what ontological sorts of thing we are referring to with those terms, so that…
Fiction and Metaphysics
Fiction and Intentionality
A good phenomenological theory must be able to account equally well for our experiences of veridical perception and hallucination, for our thoughts about universities, colors, numbers, mythical figures and more. For all of these are characteristic mental acts, and a theory of intentionality should be a theory of conscious acts in general, not just of consciousness of a specific kind of thing or of a specific kind of consciousness. In so far as ph…
How can we come to know metaphysical modal truths
Replies to Comments on Ontology Made Easy
I'd like to begin by thanking Katherine Hawley, Daniel Korman and Stephen Schiffer for their extremely interesting and insightful comments, which very much enrich the discussion. I am both honored and grateful that such fine philosophers would spend their time and careful attention on my work. Since there doesn't seem to be significant overlap across their concerns, I will simply respond to each in turn
What Do Easy Inferences Get Us
In Ontology Made Easy (2015), I defend the idea that there are ‘easy’ inferences that begin from uncontroversial premises and end with answers to disputed ontological questions. But what do easy inferences really get us? Bueno and Cumpa (this journal, 2020) argue that easy inferences don’t tell us about the natures of properties —they don’t tell us what properties are . Moreover, they argue, by accepting an ontologically neutral quantifier we can…
Précis of Ontology Made Easy
Metaphysical Arguments Against Ordinary Objects
Several prominent attacks on the objects of ‘folk ontology’ argue that these would be omitted from a scientific ontology, or would be ‘rivals’ of scientific objects for their claims to be efficacious, occupy space, be composed of parts, or possess a range of other properties. I examine causal redundancy and over determination arguments, ‘nothing over and above’ appeals, and arguments based on problems with collocation and with property additivity…
Fiction and Intentionality
A good phenomenological theory must be able to account equally well for our experiences of veridical perception and hallucination, for our thoughts about universities, colors, numbers, mythical figures and more. For all of these are characteristic mental acts, and a theory of intentionality should be a theory of conscious acts in general, not just of consciousness of a specific kind of thing or of a specific kind of consciousness. In so far as ph…
Moderate Realism and Its Logic
In this book D. W. Mertz applies the rules and systems of mathematics and logic to instance ontology, or particularism-the doctrine that asserts the individuality of properties and relations. He surveys the history of instance ontology in writings from ancient times to the present, offers a lucid argument for its validity and extraordinary problem-solving capacities, and associates it with a version of the realist position he calls moderate reali…
Denying Existence
Introduction: The Puzzle of Singular Existence-Denials. 1. The Scaffolding for a Solution. 2. The Logical Form of Existence-Assertions. 3. Singular Death-Sentences. 4. An Enquiry into the Meaning and Truth of Fictional Discourse. 5. Deeper Troubles with Fiction: Reference, Emotion and Indeterminacy. 6. Appearing Unreals. 7. The Marvel of the Master Game. 8. Concluding Unsemantic Postscript. Appendix: The Problem of the Nonexistent in Indian Philo…
Fiction and Metaphysics
Realism and Human Kinds
It is often noted that institutional objects and artifacts depend on human beliefs and intentions and so fail to meet the realist paradigm of mind‐independent objects. In this paper I draw out exactly in what ways the thesis of mind‐independence fails, and show that it has some surprising consequences. For the specific forms of mind‐dependence involved entail that we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own institutional a…
Foundations for a Social Ontology
Fictional Characters and Literary Practices
I argue that the ontological status of fictional characters is determined by the beliefs and practices of those who competently deal with works of literature, and draw out three important consequences of this. First, heavily revisionary theories cannot be considered as ‘discoveries’ about the ‘true nature’ of fictional characters; any acceptable realist theory of fiction must preserve all or most of the common conception of fictional characters. …
Metaphysical Arguments Against Ordinary Objects
Several prominent attacks on the objects of ‘folk ontology’ argue that these would be omitted from a scientific ontology, or would be ‘rivals’ of scientific objects for their claims to be efficacious, occupy space, be composed of parts, or possess a range of other properties. I examine causal redundancy and over determination arguments, ‘nothing over and above’ appeals, and arguments based on problems with collocation and with property additivity…
Debates about the Ontology of Art
Philosophers have placed some or all works of art in nearly every available ontological category, with some considering them to be physical objects, others abstract structures, imaginary entities, action types or tokens, and so on. How can we decide which among these views to accept? I argue that the rules of use for sortal terms like "painting" and "symphony" establish what ontological sorts of thing we are referring to with those terms, so that…
Ordinary Objects
Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common. Some arguments for eliminativism are based on demands for parsimony or for a non-arbitrary answer to the special composition question; others arise from prohibitions against causal redundancy, ontological vagueness, or colocation; and others still come from worries that a common sense ontology would be a riv…
Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics
Artifacts and Human Concepts
It is frequently observed that artifacts and other social and cultural objects are in some sense ‘creations of the mind’, depending in certain ways on human beliefs or activities. But in what sense are such objects and kinds dependent on human concepts and intentions? And what difference does this make to the place of such objects in our philosophical theories?
Real Natures and Familiar Objects
Social Entities
The social sciences study social entities, including social facts, social actions, and social objects. Social entities seem to differ from merely natural objects like sticks and stones in an important respect, however: they are, in some sense, human constructions and would not exist without human habits, practices, beliefs, and/or agreements. Social facts, as Durkheim observed, have “coercive power, by virtue of which they impose themselves” on h…
The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects
The basic philosophical controversy regarding ordinary objects is: Do tables and chairs, sticks and stones, exist? This paper aims to do two things: first, to explain why how this can be a controversy at all, and second, to explain why this controversy has arisen so late in the history of philosophy. Section 1 begins by discussing why the ‘obvious’ sensory evidence in favor of ordinary objects is not taken to be decisive. It goes on to review the…
Deflationism in Semantics and Metaphysics
Various forms of deflationism have been defended in various arenas. On the semantic side, there is deflationism about truth, reference, and meaning, all of which are popular, perhaps even orthodox. On the metaphysical side, there is deflationism about existence, and meta‐ontological deflationism about ontological debates. Unlike their semantic counterparts, these views have gone unnoticed or been widely attacked. The purpose of this chapter is to…
What can philosophy really do?
Interdisciplinary Introduction to Categorization
This interview provides the answers of three prominent categorisation scholars to the same set of seven questions they were sent. These questions should be seen as «naïve », in the sense that they were aimed to be as intuitive and disciplinary-independent as possible. This has been done in order to allow contrasting answers to emerge. Amie Thomasson is professor in philosophy at the University of Miami, Dvora Yanow has hold a « strategic chair » …
Replies to Comments on Ontology Made Easy
I'd like to begin by thanking Katherine Hawley, Daniel Korman and Stephen Schiffer for their extremely interesting and insightful comments, which very much enrich the discussion. I am both honored and grateful that such fine philosophers would spend their time and careful attention on my work. Since there doesn't seem to be significant overlap across their concerns, I will simply respond to each in turn
The ontology of social groups
Précis of Ontology Made Easy
A Pragmatic Method for Normative Conceptual Work
How ought we to do work in conceptual ethics? Some have thought that conceptual choice should itself be guided by (heavyweight) metaphysics—for we should be sure that our concepts pick out things that exist or should aim to choose concepts that really ‘carve the world at its joints’. An alternative is to take a pragmatic approach to conceptual ethics. But pragmatic approaches are often criticized as unable to account for intuitions that some conc…
How can we come to know metaphysical modal truths
What Do Easy Inferences Get Us
In Ontology Made Easy (2015), I defend the idea that there are ‘easy’ inferences that begin from uncontroversial premises and end with answers to disputed ontological questions. But what do easy inferences really get us? Bueno and Cumpa (this journal, 2020) argue that easy inferences don’t tell us about the natures of properties —they don’t tell us what properties are . Moreover, they argue, by accepting an ontologically neutral quantifier we can…
Prospects for a Quietist Moral Realism
Quietist Moral Realists accept that there are moral facts and properties, while aiming to avoid many of the explanatory burdens thought to fall on traditional moral realists. This chapter examines the forms that Quietist Moral Realism has taken and the challenges it has faced, in order to better assess its prospects. The best hope, this chapter argues, lies in a pragmatist approach that distinguishes the different functions of diverse areas of di…
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