Prospects for a Quietist Moral Realism

Quietist Moral Realists accept that there are moral facts and properties, while aiming to avoid many of the explanatory burdens thought to fall on traditional moral realists. This chapter examines the forms that Quietist Moral Realism has taken and the challenges it has faced, in order to better assess its prospects. The best hope, this chapter argues, lies in a pragmatist approach that distinguishes the different functions of diverse areas of discourse. This paves the way for a form of Quietism that does not simply remain quiet about the explanatory demands of metaethics, but rather is able to diagnose where they go wrong. By combining a neo pragmatic analysis of the discourse with an easy approach to ontology, we can develop a form of Quietist Moral Realism that is far stronger than critics of quietism have appreciated.

Critical realism (philosophy of perception) · Economics · Epistemology · Moral philosophy · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Moral reasoning · Ontology · Order (exchange) · Philosophical realism · Pragmatism · Realism · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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