Liz Newton
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 160602 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Liz Newton |
| PRENOMES | Liz |
| SOBRENOME | Newton |
| ASSINATURA | NEWTON L |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Glasgow |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3243-1337 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 5 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 5 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2001 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Reverse-Engineering Risk
Three philosophical accounts of risk dominate the contemporary literature. On the probabilistic account, risk has to do with the probability of a disvaluable event obtaining; on the modal account, it has to do with the modal closeness of that event obtaining; on the normic account, it has to do with the normalcy of that event obtaining. The debate between these accounts has proceeded via counterexample-trading, with each account having some cases…
What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa’s ‘epistemic explanations’
This paper develops and defends novel accounts of accurate and reasonable doubt. We take a cue from Sosa's telic epistemic normative picture to argue that one’s degree of doubt that p is accurate just in case it matches the level of veritic risk involved in believing that p. In turn, on this account, reasonable doubt is doubt that is generated by a properly functioning cognitive capacity with the function of encoding veritic risk
Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk
In this paper, I provide an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: the risk of believing in error. The motivation for this account is threefold. First, it makes epistemic anxiety a species of anxiety, thus rendering psychologically respectable a notion that has heretofore been taken seriously only by epistemologists. Second, it illuminates the relationship between anxiety and risk. It is standard in psychology to…
The epistemic significance of modal factors
This paper evaluates whether and to what extent modal constraints on knowledge or the semantics of ‘knows’, which make essential reference to what goes on in other possible worlds, can be considered non - epistemic factors with epistemic significance . This is best understood as the question whether modal factors are non-truth-relevant factors that make the difference between true belief and knowledge, or to whether a true belief falls under the …
Self and Illness
Increasingly since the 1950s mentally ill people in the Western world have been removed from institutional care. In this paper I am concerned primarily with the response of psychiatric patients to living in a ‘normal’ community environment, in particular the extent to which they are able to assume new social roles and identities after long periods of institutional care. I conclude that despite persistent mental illness, deinstitutionalised patien…
Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk
In this paper, I provide an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: the risk of believing in error. The motivation for this account is threefold. First, it makes epistemic anxiety a species of anxiety, thus rendering psychologically respectable a notion that has heretofore been taken seriously only by epistemologists. Second, it illuminates the relationship between anxiety and risk. It is standard in psychology to…
Self and Illness
Increasingly since the 1950s mentally ill people in the Western world have been removed from institutional care. In this paper I am concerned primarily with the response of psychiatric patients to living in a ‘normal’ community environment, in particular the extent to which they are able to assume new social roles and identities after long periods of institutional care. I conclude that despite persistent mental illness, deinstitutionalised patien…
The epistemic significance of modal factors
This paper evaluates whether and to what extent modal constraints on knowledge or the semantics of ‘knows’, which make essential reference to what goes on in other possible worlds, can be considered non - epistemic factors with epistemic significance . This is best understood as the question whether modal factors are non-truth-relevant factors that make the difference between true belief and knowledge, or to whether a true belief falls under the …
Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk
In this paper, I provide an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: the risk of believing in error. The motivation for this account is threefold. First, it makes epistemic anxiety a species of anxiety, thus rendering psychologically respectable a notion that has heretofore been taken seriously only by epistemologists. Second, it illuminates the relationship between anxiety and risk. It is standard in psychology to…
What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa’s ‘epistemic explanations’
This paper develops and defends novel accounts of accurate and reasonable doubt. We take a cue from Sosa's telic epistemic normative picture to argue that one’s degree of doubt that p is accurate just in case it matches the level of veritic risk involved in believing that p. In turn, on this account, reasonable doubt is doubt that is generated by a properly functioning cognitive capacity with the function of encoding veritic risk
Reverse-Engineering Risk
Three philosophical accounts of risk dominate the contemporary literature. On the probabilistic account, risk has to do with the probability of a disvaluable event obtaining; on the modal account, it has to do with the modal closeness of that event obtaining; on the normic account, it has to do with the normalcy of that event obtaining. The debate between these accounts has proceeded via counterexample-trading, with each account having some cases…
Epistemology (4 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 obras) · Metaphysics (3 obras) · Philosophy of language (3 obras) · Philosophy of science (3 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 obras) · Philosophy of mind (2 obras) · Psychiatry (2 obras) · Psychology (2 obras)