Reverse-Engineering Risk
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21461685 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Angela O’Sullivan (0000-0003-2038-3451, University of Glasgow, autor correspondente), Liz Newton (0000-0002-3243-1337, University of Glasgow) |
| Ano | 2025 |
| Volume | 90 |
| Fascículo | 5 |
| Páginas | 2021-2046 |
| Data de publicação | 2025-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Erkenntnis (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0165-0106 • E-ISSN: 1572-8420 |
| Editora | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10670-024-00788-6 |
| OpenAlex | W4392594465 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 1 |
| Referências citadas | 39 |
Three philosophical accounts of risk dominate the contemporary literature. On the probabilistic account, risk has to do with the probability of a disvaluable event obtaining; on the modal account, it has to do with the modal closeness of that event obtaining; on the normic account, it has to do with the normalcy of that event obtaining. The debate between these accounts has proceeded via counterexample-trading, with each account having some cases it explains better than others, and some cases that it cannot explain at all. In this article, we attempt to break the impasse between the three accounts of risk through a shift in methodology. We investigate the concept of risk via the method of conceptual reverse-engineering, whereby a theorist reconstructs the need that a concept serves for a group of agents in order to illuminate the shape of the concept: its intension and extension. We suggest that risk functions to meet our need to make decisions that reduce disvalue under conditions of uncertainty. Our project makes plausible that risk is a pluralist concept: meeting this need requires that risk takes different forms in different contexts. But our pluralism is principled: each of these different forms are part of one and the same concept, that has a ‘core-to-periphery’ structure, where the form the concept takes in typical cases (at its ‘core’) explains the form it takes in less typical cases (at its ‘periphery’). We then apply our findings to epistemic risk , to resolve an ambiguity in how ‘epistemic risk’ is standardly understood
Business · Epistemology · Ontology · Computer Science · Construction Project Management and Performance · Philosophy
Truth as One and Many
Between Probability and Certainty
A Pragmatic Method for Normative Conceptual Work
I—Crispin Wright
Problems of the Self
Teleologies and the Methodology of Epistemology
Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk
Risk
Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes
In defence of the modal account of legal risk
Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk
An objection to the modal account of risk
Varieties of Risk
The Practical Origins of Ideas
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk
The Policy Implications of Differing Concepts of Risk
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 1 |