Charles Pigden

Dados Biográficos

ID2149041
NOMECharles Pigden
PRENOMESCharles
SOBRENOMEPigden
ASSINATURAPIGDEN C
AFILIAÇÕESUniversity of Otago
VERIFICADONão
TOTAL DE OBRAS11
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES33
TOTAL COMO AUTOR11
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO1988
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2025
ÍNDICE H2

  • Particularism Reaffirmed

    Kåre Hagen, M R X Dentith et al.ARTICLESocial Epistemology2025

    In the philosophical debate over the epistemic status of conspiracy theories, the view that each theory ought to be judged on its own merits, ‘particularism’, has the upper hand. But challenges to this view continue to be put forth; this paper summarizes that debate and reaffirms the particularist perspective. In this paper, we address how different conceptions of what counts as a ‘conspiracy theory’ impact how one might evaluate particularism, w…

  • How to make conspiracy theory research intellectually respectable (and what it might be like if it were)

    Open AccessCharles PigdenARTICLEInquiry2025

    A great deal of conspiracy theory research presupposes a falsehood – that conspiracy theories as such are irrational to believe – and that conspiracy theorists as such suffer from a range of cognitive defects. But since people frequently conspire, many people believe in a wide range of conspiracy theories because they themselves are historically and politically literate. Thus, research questions like ‘Why Do People Believe in Conspiracy Theories?…

  • ‘Conspiracy Theory’ as a Tonkish Term

    Open AccessCharles PigdenARTICLESocial Epistemology2023

    I argue that ‘conspiracy theory’ and ‘conspiracy theorist’ as commonly employed are ‘tonkish’ terms (as defined by Arthur Prior and Michael Dummett), licensing inferences from truths to falsehoods; indeed, that they are mega-tonkish terms, since their use is governed by different and competing sets of introduction and elimination rules, delivering different and inconsistent results. Thus ‘conspiracy theory’ and ‘conspiracy theorist’ do not have d…

  • Hume on Is and Ought

    Charles Pigden, Paul RussellBOOKOxford Handbook of Hume2015

    Hume contends that you can’t get an ought from an is. Searle professed to prove otherwise, deriving a conclusion about obligations from premises about promises. Since can’t derive a substantive ought from an is by logic alone, Searle is best construed as claiming that there are analytic bridge principles linking premises about promises to conclusions about obligations. But we can no more derive a moral obligation to pay up from the fact that a pr…

  • A ‘Sensible Knave’? Hume, Jane Austen and Mr Elliot

    Charles PigdenARTICLEIntellectual History Review2012

    Our theme in this issue is Women, Literature and Philosophy.My paper will, I hope, be ontopic, since it deals with what I take to be one woman's literary response to a philosophical problem.The woman is Jane Austen, the problem is the rationality of Hume's 'sensible knave', and Austen's response is to deepen the problem.Despite his enthusiasm for virtue, Hume reluctantly concedes in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 1 that injustice…

  • Une superstition moderne

    Charles PigdenARTICLEAgone2012

  • Bertrand Russell

    Open AccessCharles Pigden, Charles R PigdenARTICLEPhilosophy of the Social Sciences1996Referências: 3

    Bertrand Russell was a meta-ethical pioneer, the original inventor of both emotivism and the error theory. Why, having abandoned emotivism for the error theory, did he switch back to emotivism in the 1920s? Perhaps he did not relish the thought that as a moralist he was a professional hypocrite. In addition, Russell's version of the error theory suffers from severe defects. He commits the naturalistic fallacy and runs afoul of his own and Moore's…

  • Popper Revisited, or What Is Wrong With Conspiracy Theories

    Open AccessCharles PigdenARTICLEPhilosophy of the Social Sciences1995Citada por: 28Referências: 2

    Conpiracy theories are widely deemed to be superstitious. Yet history appears to be littered with conspiracies successful and otherwise. (For this reason, "cock-up" theories cannot in general replace conspiracy theories, since in many cases the cock-ups are simply failed conspiracies.) Why then is it silly to suppose that historical events are sometimes due to conspiracy? The only argument available to this author is drawn from the work of the la…

  • Geach on `Good

    Charles Pigden, Charles R PigdenARTICLEThe Philosophical Quarterly1990Citada por: 2

    Journal Article Geach on 'Good' Get access Charles R. Pigden Charles R. Pigden University of Otago, New Zealand Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 159, April 1990, Pages 129–154, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219807 Published: 01 April 1990

  • Logic and the autonomy of ethics

    Charles Pigden, Charles R PigdenARTICLEAustralasian Journal of Philosophy1989

    In every system of morality I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or ought not. This change is imperceptible, …

  • Anscombe on `Ought

    Charles PigdenARTICLEThe Philosophical Quarterly1988Citada por: 3Referências: 2

    Journal Article Anscombe on ‘Ought’ Get access Charles Pigden Charles Pigden Massey University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 150, January 1988, Pages 20–41, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220265 Published: 01 January 1988