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Vijay Krishna

Dados Biográficos

ID3591752
NOMEVijay Krishna
PRENOMESVijay
SOBRENOMEKrishna
ASSINATURAKRISHNA V
AFILIAÇÕESPennsylvania State University
ORCID0000-0002-6169-5622
VERIFICADOSim
TOTAL DE OBRAS4
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES47
TOTAL COMO AUTOR4
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO1997
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2020
ÍNDICE H2
  • Startups and Upstarts

    Yu Awaya, Vijay Krishna•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2020•Citada por: 1•Referências: 3

    We study an R&D race between an established firm and a startup under asymmetric information. R&D investment brings success stochastically, but only if the innovation is feasible. The only asymmetry is that the established firm has better information about the feasibility of the innovation. We show that there is an equilibrium in which the poorly informed startup wins more often, and has higher expected profits, than the better-informed incumbent.…

  • Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections

    Vijay Krishna, John Morgan•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2011•Citada por: 12•Referências: 9

    We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence. While the ideology of the candidates is commonly known, voters are imperfectly informed about competence. Voter preferences, however, are such that ideology alone determines voting. When voting is compulsory, the candidate of the majority ideology prevails, and this may not be optimal from a social perspective. However, when voting is volu…

  • Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules

    Open Access•Vijay Krishna•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2001•Citada por: 34•Referências: 8

    We reexamine the major tenets of the informational theory of legislative rules, focusing on the informational efficiency of rules with varying degrees of restrictiveness. When committees are heterogeneous, full efficiency is attainable under the unrestrictive open rule as well as the somewhat restrictive modified rule. In contrast, the restrictive closed rule always leads to inefficiencies. When committees are homogeneous, the situation is differ…

  • Global vs Local Advertising in Taiwan

    Open Access•Vijay Krishna, Reuyling Chuang et al.•ARTICLE•Gazette (Leiden Netherlands•1997•Referências: 4

    This article investigates the differences in Taiwanese television advertisements for local and global products with regard to the degree of informativeness, type of cues and product class. The sample included advertisements that appeared on the three major networks (CTV, TTV and CTS) in 1993. The majority of the advertisements promote local brands. Results indicate a significant difference between global and local advertisements with regard to th…

  • Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules

    Open Access•Vijay Krishna•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2001•Citada por: 34•Referências: 8

    We reexamine the major tenets of the informational theory of legislative rules, focusing on the informational efficiency of rules with varying degrees of restrictiveness. When committees are heterogeneous, full efficiency is attainable under the unrestrictive open rule as well as the somewhat restrictive modified rule. In contrast, the restrictive closed rule always leads to inefficiencies. When committees are homogeneous, the situation is differ…

  • Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections

    Vijay Krishna, John Morgan•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2011•Citada por: 12•Referências: 9

    We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence. While the ideology of the candidates is commonly known, voters are imperfectly informed about competence. Voter preferences, however, are such that ideology alone determines voting. When voting is compulsory, the candidate of the majority ideology prevails, and this may not be optimal from a social perspective. However, when voting is volu…

  • Startups and Upstarts

    Yu Awaya, Vijay Krishna•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2020•Citada por: 1•Referências: 3

    We study an R&D race between an established firm and a startup under asymmetric information. R&D investment brings success stochastically, but only if the innovation is feasible. The only asymmetry is that the established firm has better information about the feasibility of the innovation. We show that there is an equilibrium in which the poorly informed startup wins more often, and has higher expected profits, than the better-informed incumbent.…

  • Global vs Local Advertising in Taiwan

    Open Access•Vijay Krishna, Reuyling Chuang et al.•ARTICLE•Gazette (Leiden Netherlands•1997•Referências: 4

    This article investigates the differences in Taiwanese television advertisements for local and global products with regard to the degree of informativeness, type of cues and product class. The sample included advertisements that appeared on the three major networks (CTV, TTV and CTS) in 1993. The majority of the advertisements promote local brands. Results indicate a significant difference between global and local advertisements with regard to th…

  • Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules

    Open Access•Vijay Krishna•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2001•Citada por: 34•Referências: 8

    We reexamine the major tenets of the informational theory of legislative rules, focusing on the informational efficiency of rules with varying degrees of restrictiveness. When committees are heterogeneous, full efficiency is attainable under the unrestrictive open rule as well as the somewhat restrictive modified rule. In contrast, the restrictive closed rule always leads to inefficiencies. When committees are homogeneous, the situation is differ…

  • Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections

    Vijay Krishna, John Morgan•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2011•Citada por: 12•Referências: 9

    We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence. While the ideology of the candidates is commonly known, voters are imperfectly informed about competence. Voter preferences, however, are such that ideology alone determines voting. When voting is compulsory, the candidate of the majority ideology prevails, and this may not be optimal from a social perspective. However, when voting is volu…

  • Startups and Upstarts

    Yu Awaya, Vijay Krishna•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2020•Citada por: 1•Referências: 3

    We study an R&D race between an established firm and a startup under asymmetric information. R&D investment brings success stochastically, but only if the innovation is feasible. The only asymmetry is that the established firm has better information about the feasibility of the innovation. We show that there is an equilibrium in which the poorly informed startup wins more often, and has higher expected profits, than the better-informed incumbent.…

Economics (3 obras) · Microeconomics (3 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 obras) · Incentive (2 obras) · Information asymmetry (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Political science (2 obras) · Advertising (1 obras)

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