Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10180901 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Vijay Krishna (0000-0002-6169-5622, Pennsylvania State University), John Morgan (0000-0001-9224-5483, University of California, Berkeley) |
| Ano | 2011 |
| Volume | 119 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 183-211 |
| Data de publicação | 2011-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Editora | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/660731 |
| OpenAlex | W3121797997 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 15 |
| Referências citadas | 22 |
We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence. While the ideology of the candidates is commonly known, voters are imperfectly informed about competence. Voter preferences, however, are such that ideology alone determines voting. When voting is compulsory, the candidate of the majority ideology prevails, and this may not be optimal from a social perspective. However, when voting is voluntary and costly, we show that turnout adjusts endogenously so that the outcome of a large election is always first-best
Competence (human resources · Economics · Ideology · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Turnout · Voter turnout · Voting · Economic Policies and Impacts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology
Adverse Selection in Distributive Politics
Electoral accountability, distributive conflict, and probabilistic voting
Poisson voting games under proportional rule
Political uncertainty, leadership and productivity
Turnout, political preferences and information
Does forced voting result in political polarization
Tax limits and local elections
Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections
A Comparative Welfare Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout
Turnout and Power Sharing
A Theory of Protest Voting
Do Voting Advice Applications Change Political Behavior
How to Increase Turnout in Low-Salience Elections
Group incentives and rational voting
Class-Biased Electoral Participation
A Constitution of Many Minds
Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
An economic theory of democracy
Economic theory of democracy
The pure theory of large two-candidate elections
Turnout and Power Sharing
A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage
Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting
Convicting the Innocent
| Obras citantes distintas | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,15 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 15 |