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Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10180901
AutoresVijay Krishna (0000-0002-6169-5622, Pennsylvania State University), John Morgan (0000-0001-9224-5483, University of California, Berkeley)
Ano2011
Volume119
Fascículo2
Páginas183-211
Data de publicação2011-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X
EditoraUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/660731
OpenAlexW3121797997
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas15
Referências citadas22

We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence. While the ideology of the candidates is commonly known, voters are imperfectly informed about competence. Voter preferences, however, are such that ideology alone determines voting. When voting is compulsory, the candidate of the majority ideology prevails, and this may not be optimal from a social perspective. However, when voting is voluntary and costly, we show that turnout adjusts endogenously so that the outcome of a large election is always first-best

Competence (human resources · Economics · Ideology · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Turnout · Voter turnout · Voting · Economic Policies and Impacts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology

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Obras citantes distintas15
Citações por ano1,15
Intervalo de citações2013 - 2026 (14)
Velocidade de citaçãocurrent
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 15
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