A Comparative Welfare Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout

Journal Article A Comparative Welfare Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout Get access Melis Kartal Melis Kartal University of Vienna Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 125, Issue 587, 1 September 2015, Pages 1369–1392, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12150 Published: 21 August 2014

Economics · Political science · Politics · Turnout · Voting · Welfare · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Social Policy and Reform Studies

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