Samuel Kahn
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3632660 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Samuel Kahn |
| PRENOMES | Samuel |
| SOBRENOME | Kahn |
| ASSINATURA | KAHN S |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6597-7646 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 26 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 2 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 26 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1937 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Kant and the duty to promote one’s own happiness
In his discussion of the duty of benevolence in §27 of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that agents have no obligation to promote their own happiness, for ‘this happens unavoidably’ (MS, AA 6:451). In this paper I argue that Kant should not have said this. I argue that Kant should have conceded that agents do have an obligation to promote their own happiness
Sing Sing Criminals
Mentality and Homosexuality
Psychological and Neurological Definitions of the Unconscious
The Guise of the Objectively Good
Defending the possible consent interpretation from actual attacks
Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kant's Formula of Universal Law
According to the standard reading of Kant's formula of universal law (FUL), positive duties can be derived from FUL. In this article, I argue that the standard reading does not work. In the first section, I articulate FUL and what I mean by a positive duty. In the second section, I set out an intuitive version of the standard reading of FUL and argue that it does not work. In the third section, I set out a more rigorous version of the standard re…
Kant and the duty to promote one’s own happiness
In his discussion of the duty of benevolence in §27 of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that agents have no obligation to promote their own happiness, for ‘this happens unavoidably’ (MS, AA 6:451). In this paper I argue that Kant should not have said this. I argue that Kant should have conceded that agents do have an obligation to promote their own happiness
Defending the Traditional Interpretations of Kant’s Formula of a Law of Nature
In this article I defend the traditional interpretations of Kant’s Formula of a Law of Nature from recent attacks levelled by Faviola Rivera-Castro, James Furner, Ido Geiger, Pauline Kleingeld and Sven Nyholm. After a short introduction, the article is divided into four main sections. In the first, I set out the basics of the three traditional interpretations, the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation an…
Veganism, Animal Welfare, and Causal Impotence
Proponents of the utilitarian animal welfare argument (AWA) for veganism maintain that it is reasonable to expect that adopting a vegan diet will decrease animal suffering. In this article I argue otherwise. I maintain that (a) there are plausible scenarios in which refraining from meat consumption will not decrease animal suffering; (b) the utilitarian AWA rests on a false dilemma; and (c) there are no reasonable grounds for the expectation that…
A Dilemma for Mathematical Constructivism
Kant’s Philosophy of Moral Luck
On the Expressive Limits of Kant’s Universalizability Tests
My goal in this piece is to show that there is a problem lurking in the shadows of recent attempts to derive positive duties from Kant’s so-called universalizability tests and, further, to show that the most obvious way of fixing these attempts renders them unable to fulfill their function. I shall begin by motivating and explaining such an attempt
Obligatory Actions, Obligatory Maxims
In this article, I confront Parfit’s Mixed Maxims Objection. I argue that recent attempts to respond to this objection fail, and I argue that their failure is compounded by the failure of recent attempts to show how the Formula of Universal Law can be used to demarcate the category of obligatory maxims. I then set out my own response to the objection, drawing on remarks from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals for inspiration and developing a novel acco…
Kant and the trolley
Consent and the Mere Means Principle
The Apple of Kant's Ethics: I‐Maxims as the Locus of Assessment
I want to distinguish between maxims at three levels of abstraction. At the first level are what I shall call individual maxims, or i‐maxims: maxim tokens as adopted by particular rational beings. At the second level are abstract maxims, or a‐maxims: abstract principles distinct from any individual who adopts them. At the third level are maxim kinds, or k‐maxims: sets of various action‐guiding principles that are grouped on the basis of their con…
Frankfurt Cases and Alternate Deontic Categories
In Harry Frankfurt’s seminal “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” he advances an argument against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: if an agent is responsible for performing some action, then she is able to do otherwise. However, almost all of the Frankfurt cases in this literature involve impermissible actions. In this article, I argue that the failure to consider other deontic categories exposes a deep problem, one that t…
Non-Accidental Rightness and the Guise of the Objectively Good
My goal in this paper is to show that two theses that are widely adopted among Kantian ethicists are irreconcilable. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I briefly sketch the contours of my own positive view of Kantian ethics, concentrating on the issues relevant to the two theses to be discussed: I argue that agents can perform actions from but not in conformity with duty, and I argue that agents intentionally can perform actio…
Legal Obligation and Ability
In Wilmot-Smith’s recent ‘Law, “Ought”, and “Can”,’ he argues that legal obligation does not imply ability. In this short reply, I show that Wilmot-Smith’s arguments do not withstand critical scrutiny. In section 1, I attack Wilmot-Smith’s argument for the claim that allowing for impossible obligations makes for a better legal system, and I introduce positive grounds for thinking otherwise. In section 2, I show that, even if Wilmot-Smith had esta…
Kant’s Position on the Wide Right to Abortion
In this article, I explicate Kant’s position on the wide right to abortion. That is, I explore the extent to which, according to Kant’s practical philosophy, abortion is punishable, even if it involves an unjust infringement of the right to life. By focusing on the state’s right to punish, rather than the right to life or the onset of personhood, I use Kant to expose a novel range of issues and questions about the legal status of abortion (and cr…
Individual Maxim Tokens, not Abstract Maxim Types
I argue that Kant’s Categorical Imperative should be applied to individual maxim tokens rather than abstract maxim types. The article is divided into five sections. In the first, I explain my thesis. In the second, I show that my thesis disagrees with Rawls. In the third, I argue for my thesis on the basis of the wording of the Categorical Imperative and on the basis of considerations about autonomy. In the fourth, I argue for my thesis on the ba…
What Makes Circumstantial Luck Different and Why it Matters
Self-Interest, Justification, and Moral Belief
Proximity Beats Proportions in Modal Accounts of Luck
Proximity Beats Proportions in Modal Accounts of LuckIn recent debates about the nature of luck, many philosophers defend a modal condition, according to which an event E is lucky for S only if E is modally fragile.However, there are two competing accounts of how this condition should be filled out: (1) proportion accounts focus on whether E fails to occur in a suitable proportion of possible worlds, whereas (2) proximity accounts focus on whethe…
Rationality, coherence, and reasons responsiveness
In Nora Heinzelmann's recent ‘Rationality is not Coherence,’ she sets out a novel and forceful challenge for coherence accounts of rationality (henceforth: CRs). Heinzelmann argues that, first, there are cases in which the norms in CRs generate conflict and, thus, agents cannot be rational; but, second, it is counterintuitive that agents cannot be rational in these cases; and, third, reasons responsiveness accounts of rationality (henceforth: RRs…
Philosophy (20 obras) · Epistemology (17 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (13 obras) · Political science (13 obras) · Free Will and Agency (11 obras) · Law (10 obras) · War, Ethics, and Justification (8 obras) · Law and economics (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Psychology (7 obras)