Norman Malcolm

• Problems of Mind

  Norman Malcolm•BOOK•Problems of Mind•2021

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• Dreaming

  Norman Malcolm•BOOK•Dreaming•2017

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  Originally published in 1959, with some corrections in 1962, the author examines the common view at the time that dreams are mental activities or mental occurrences taking place during sleep. He starts off by offering a proof that the sentence ‘I am asleep’ is a senseless form of words and cannot express a judgment. After commenting on various features of the concept of sleep, the author expands his argument to prove that the notion of making any…

• Wittgenstein

  James Kellenberger, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1995

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  This essay is the last work by the distinguished philosopher Norman Malcolm, before his death in the summer of 1990. Malcolm first draws together a large collection of remarks made by Wittgenstein at various stages of his life, and in many different contexts, which are expressive of his attitude to religion. He discusses both some of the ways in which Wittgenstein was drawn to religious ways of thinking, and also speculates on the barriers which …

• Nothing is Hidden

  David Pears, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1989

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• Nothing is Hidden

  Peter Carruthers, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1987

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  Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein's Criticism of his Early Thought. BY Norman Malcolm. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. Pp. xii + 252. Price: £22.50.) Peter Carruthers Peter Carruthers University of Essex Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Issue 148, July 1987, Pages 328–331, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220405 Published: 01 July 1987

• Consciousness and Causality

  Michael Tye, D M Armstrong et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1986•Citada por: 1

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  Two distinguished philosophers present opposing views on the questions of howthe objects of consciousness are perceived. (Philosophy)

• Memory and Mind

  Richard B Brandt, Richard Brandt et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1979

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• Memory and Mind

  Godfrey Vesey, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1978

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  Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Memory and Mind. By Nobman Malcolm. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1977. Pp. 277. Price £10.00) Godfrey Vesey Godfrey Vesey Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 28, Issue 110, January 1978, Pages 80–81, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219050 Published: 01 January 1978

• Memory and Mind

  Edward Wilson Averill, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1978•Citada por: 4

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• Problems of Mind

  C H Whiteley, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1972

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  Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Problems of Mind : Descartes to Wittgenstein. By Norman Malcolm. (New York: Harper & Row. 1971. Pp. xiii + 103. £7.00) C. H. Whiteley C. H. Whiteley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 22, Issue 89, October 1972, Page 367, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218318 Published: 01 October 1972

• The Conceivability of Mechanism

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1968•Citada por: 19

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  1 BY I am going to understand a special application of physical determinism-namely, to all organisms with neurological systems, including human beings. The version of mechanism I wish to study assumes a neurophysiological theory which is adequate to explain and predict all movements of human bodies except those caused by outside forces. The human body is assumed to be as complete a causal system as is a gasoline engine. Neurological states and pr…

• Wittgenstein's Philosophische Bermerkungen

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1967

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• Explaining Behavior

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1967•Citada por: 2

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• Knowledge of Other Minds

  Norman Malcolm•CHAPTER•Wittgenstein•1966

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• Descartes's Proof that his Essence is Thinking

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1965

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  I. Q UM RES COGITANS. It is not difficult to understand K Descartes's conviction that by means of his first principle, cogito ergo sum, he had proved his own existence with certainty. It is more difficult to understand how he moves from the thesis that since he thinks therefore his existence is certain, to the thesis that his nature is nothing but thinking and he is entirely distinct from body.' His critic, Hobbes, regarded the transition from co…

• Rejoinder to Mr. Sosa

  Open Access•Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1965

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  I believe that Mr. Sosa is right about my example but wrong on the substantive issue; which shows that my example was poorly chosen. If the ugliest Irishman was so ugly that even the Irish were offended, they might form a committee to get rid of him. Suppose he was kidnapped and deposited in New York. If we were informed of all this and also knew that the ugliest Irishman is the Prime Minister, I agree that we should have been given an adequate e…

• Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory

  Open Access•Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1964•Citada por: 1•Referências: 1

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  My main topic will be, roughly speaking, the claim that mental events or conscious experiences or inner experiences are brain processes. I hasten to say, however, that I am not going to talk about “mental events” or “conscious experiences” or “inner experiences.” These expressions are almost exclusively philosophers terms, and I am not sure that I have got the hang of any of them. Philosophers are not in agreement in their use of these terms. One…

• Dreaming

  V C Chappell, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1962

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• Dreaming

  R M Yost, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1960

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• Ludwig Wittgenstein

  Gregory Vlastos, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1960

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  This moving and authoritative portrait of Ludwig Wittgenstein--one of the most powerful influences on contemporary philosophy--treats Wittgenstein the man, his unusual teaching methods, and his modes of thought and expression as seen through the eyes of Norman Malcolm, first as a student and later as a close personal friend. This new edition contains the complete text of fifty-seven letters written by Wittgenstein to Malcolm over a period of elev…

• Anselm's Ontological Arguments

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1960•Citada por: 14

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  I BELIEVE that in Anselm's Proslogion and Responsio editoris there are two different pieces of reasoning which he did not distinguish from one another, and that a good deal of light may be shed on philosophical problem of the ontological argument if we do distinguish them. In Chapter 2 of Proslogiont Anselm says that we believe that God is a greater than which cannot be conceived. (The Latin is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit. Anselm some…

• English Philosophy Since 1900

  Norman Malcolm, G J Warnock•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1959

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• I. Knowledge of Other Minds

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1958

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• Dreaming and Skepticism

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1956•Citada por: 4

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• Consciousness and causality

  D M Armstrong, Norman Malcolm

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• The Conceivability of Mechanism

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1968•Citada por: 19

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  1 BY I am going to understand a special application of physical determinism-namely, to all organisms with neurological systems, including human beings. The version of mechanism I wish to study assumes a neurophysiological theory which is adequate to explain and predict all movements of human bodies except those caused by outside forces. The human body is assumed to be as complete a causal system as is a gasoline engine. Neurological states and pr…

• Anselm's Ontological Arguments

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1960•Citada por: 14

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  I BELIEVE that in Anselm's Proslogion and Responsio editoris there are two different pieces of reasoning which he did not distinguish from one another, and that a good deal of light may be shed on philosophical problem of the ontological argument if we do distinguish them. In Chapter 2 of Proslogiont Anselm says that we believe that God is a greater than which cannot be conceived. (The Latin is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit. Anselm some…

• Memory and Mind

  Edward Wilson Averill, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1978•Citada por: 4

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• Dreaming and Skepticism

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1956•Citada por: 4

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• Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1954•Citada por: 4

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• Philosophy for Philosophers

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1951•Citada por: 3

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• Defending Common Sense

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1949•Citada por: 3

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• Explaining Behavior

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1967•Citada por: 2

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• Consciousness and Causality

  Michael Tye, D M Armstrong et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1986•Citada por: 1

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  Two distinguished philosophers present opposing views on the questions of howthe objects of consciousness are perceived. (Philosophy)

• Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory

  Open Access•Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1964•Citada por: 1•Referências: 1

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  My main topic will be, roughly speaking, the claim that mental events or conscious experiences or inner experiences are brain processes. I hasten to say, however, that I am not going to talk about “mental events” or “conscious experiences” or “inner experiences.” These expressions are almost exclusively philosophers terms, and I am not sure that I have got the hang of any of them. Philosophers are not in agreement in their use of these terms. One…

• Defending Common Sense

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1949•Citada por: 3

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• Russell's Human Knowledge

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1950

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• The Perception of the Visual World

  Norman Malcolm, James J Gibson•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1951

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• The Rise of Scientific Philosophy

  Norman Malcolm, Hans Reichenbach•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1951

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  This book represents a new approach to philosophy. It treats philosophy as not a collection of systems, but as a study of problems. It recognizes in traditional philosophical systems the historical function of having asked questions rather than having given solutions. Professor Reichenbach traces the failures of the systems to psychological causes. Speculative philosophers offered answers at a time when science had not yet provided the means to g…

• Philosophy for Philosophers

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1951•Citada por: 3

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• Iii.—knowledge and Belief

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•Mind•1952

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  III.—KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF Get access NORMAN MALCOLM NORMAN MALCOLM Cornell University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume LXI, Issue 242, April 1952, Pages 178–189, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXI.242.178 Published: 01 April 1952

• Die Erkenntnis und Ihre Leistung

  Norman Malcolm, B Juhos•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1952

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• Direct Perception

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1953

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• Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1954•Citada por: 4

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• Thinking and Experience

  Norman Malcolm, H H Price•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1954

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• Dreaming and Skepticism

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1956•Citada por: 4

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• I. Knowledge of Other Minds

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1958

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• English Philosophy Since 1900

  Norman Malcolm, G J Warnock•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1959

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• Dreaming

  R M Yost, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1960

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• Ludwig Wittgenstein

  Gregory Vlastos, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1960

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  This moving and authoritative portrait of Ludwig Wittgenstein--one of the most powerful influences on contemporary philosophy--treats Wittgenstein the man, his unusual teaching methods, and his modes of thought and expression as seen through the eyes of Norman Malcolm, first as a student and later as a close personal friend. This new edition contains the complete text of fifty-seven letters written by Wittgenstein to Malcolm over a period of elev…

• Anselm's Ontological Arguments

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1960•Citada por: 14

  Incluir item

  I BELIEVE that in Anselm's Proslogion and Responsio editoris there are two different pieces of reasoning which he did not distinguish from one another, and that a good deal of light may be shed on philosophical problem of the ontological argument if we do distinguish them. In Chapter 2 of Proslogiont Anselm says that we believe that God is a greater than which cannot be conceived. (The Latin is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit. Anselm some…

• Dreaming

  V C Chappell, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1962

  Incluir item

• Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory

  Open Access•Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1964•Citada por: 1•Referências: 1

  Incluir item

  My main topic will be, roughly speaking, the claim that mental events or conscious experiences or inner experiences are brain processes. I hasten to say, however, that I am not going to talk about “mental events” or “conscious experiences” or “inner experiences.” These expressions are almost exclusively philosophers terms, and I am not sure that I have got the hang of any of them. Philosophers are not in agreement in their use of these terms. One…

• Descartes's Proof that his Essence is Thinking

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1965

  Incluir item

  I. Q UM RES COGITANS. It is not difficult to understand K Descartes's conviction that by means of his first principle, cogito ergo sum, he had proved his own existence with certainty. It is more difficult to understand how he moves from the thesis that since he thinks therefore his existence is certain, to the thesis that his nature is nothing but thinking and he is entirely distinct from body.' His critic, Hobbes, regarded the transition from co…

• Rejoinder to Mr. Sosa

  Open Access•Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1965

  Incluir item

  I believe that Mr. Sosa is right about my example but wrong on the substantive issue; which shows that my example was poorly chosen. If the ugliest Irishman was so ugly that even the Irish were offended, they might form a committee to get rid of him. Suppose he was kidnapped and deposited in New York. If we were informed of all this and also knew that the ugliest Irishman is the Prime Minister, I agree that we should have been given an adequate e…

• Knowledge of Other Minds

  Norman Malcolm•CHAPTER•Wittgenstein•1966

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• Wittgenstein's Philosophische Bermerkungen

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1967

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• Explaining Behavior

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1967•Citada por: 2

  Incluir item

• The Conceivability of Mechanism

  Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1968•Citada por: 19

  Incluir item

  1 BY I am going to understand a special application of physical determinism-namely, to all organisms with neurological systems, including human beings. The version of mechanism I wish to study assumes a neurophysiological theory which is adequate to explain and predict all movements of human bodies except those caused by outside forces. The human body is assumed to be as complete a causal system as is a gasoline engine. Neurological states and pr…

• Problems of Mind

  C H Whiteley, Norman Malcolm•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1972

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  Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Problems of Mind : Descartes to Wittgenstein. By Norman Malcolm. (New York: Harper & Row. 1971. Pp. xiii + 103. £7.00) C. H. Whiteley C. H. Whiteley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 22, Issue 89, October 1972, Page 367, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218318 Published: 01 October 1972

Philosophy (32 obras) · Epistemology (27 obras) · Contemporary philosophy (19 obras) · Psychology (17 obras) · Analytic philosophy (15 obras) · General interest (13 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (9 obras) · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications (7 obras) · Art (4 obras) · Cognitive science (4 obras)