Urs Steiner Brandt
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 384094 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Urs Steiner Brandt |
| PRENOMES | Urs Steiner |
| SOBRENOME | Brandt |
| ASSINATURA | BRANDT U S |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Southern Denmark |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2568-9759 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 20 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 20 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2002 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Who faces the burden of coastal flooding? Comparing social vulnerability and flood exposure to assess distributive justice at the Danish coast
While just adaptation is quickly becoming a core concept in climate change adaptation discourse, empirical research on operationalizing justice and equity in adaptation planning remains scarce. Specifically, empirical approaches to assessing distributive justice in the context of climate change-related hazards are lacking. Thus, we often do not know how exposure to climate change-related hazards is distributed across social groups or whether vuln…
Did Ethelred the Unready make optimal choices when paying Danegeld to Svein Forkbeard? Viking Age England and game theory
King Ethelred’s repeated payments to Viking armies are often portrayed as evidence of political weakness and strategic failure. This paper reinterprets these actions within a rational choice framework, asking whether Ethelred the Unready acted optimally when paying King Svein Forkbeard to withdraw from England between 991 and 1012. Drawing on historical evidence from five documented Danegeld payments, we develop a formal model in which tribute an…
A comprehensive approach for assessing social flood vulnerability and social flood risk
Flood risk assessment approaches have traditionally been dominated by measures of economic damage. However, the importance of understanding the social impacts of flooding are increasingly being acknowledged. Social vulnerability indices have been constructed in diverse geographical contexts to understand relative susceptibility of different social groups to flood hazards. However, integrated assessments of social vulnerability, exposure, and haza…
Toward a third-generation rational choice theory
This paper aims to contribute to the development of a “third-generation” rational choice theory by introducing a Multiple Player Approach for analysing collective action problems. Drawing on the foundational first and second generation works of Olson (The logic of collective action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965) and Ostrom (Scand Polit Stud 23(1):3–16), we introduce five player types that we believe capture essential empirical feat…
Can we provide appropriate tools to measure the effectiveness of climate agreements? The Paris agreement and the role of the European External Action Service
Can we provide appropriate tools to measure the effectiveness of climate agreements? How effective will, for example, the Paris Agreement be? Global emissions levels can be applied as a sole measure of performance. Current emission trends predict 2.7 degrees of temperature increase in the year 2100. The challenge rests in both the unavailability or difficulty of compiling proper data and information and the dynamic aspect which demands estimates …
The survival game
How do people survive under extreme conditions? Will selfish, non-cooperating free-rider types – the solo players – have the best chances of surviving? Or would cooperating, hard-working types – the team players – have higher chances? All morale put aside, it is interesting to know whether non-cooperation or cooperation pays off in a game characterized by scarcity and hard competition for survival. A study of people in such a Hobbesian state of n…
Is the annual UNFCCC COP the only game in town
Is the annual United Nations framework convention on climate change meetings (UNFCCC COP) the only game in town? Are there also other possible solutions to consider? We argue that there is indeed another game, namely unilateral action facilitated by public authorities. Our theoretical model shows the conditions under which unilateral and costly technology development can be spread to other countries; that is, to an extent that makes such action o…
Does higher health literacy lead to higher trust in public hospitals
It is important that health care professionals understand that some patient groups have a higher chance of cooperation (e.g., agreeing on the choice of treatment) or defection (e.g. passing a complaint) than others. In perspective, future research should undertake further qualitative examinations of possible patient types and their demands in relation to different health care sectors, focusing specifically on the opportunities to improve the hand…
The calculus of democratic deliberation
How robust is the welfare state when facing open borders? An evolutionary game-theoretic model
How robust is the welfare state when confronting open borders? To answer that question, we develop an evolutionary game-theoretic model combined with an ingroup–outgroup model. The simulations reveal that welfare states in general will transform into low-welfare societies unless the societies in time generate a sufficiently large amount of social recognition of the reciprocators in such a crisis. The recognition implies that the “always cooperato…
Detecting critical choke points for achieving Good Environmental Status in European seas
Potts, T., T. O'Higgins, R. Brennan, S. Cinnirella, U. Steiner Brandt, J. De Vivero, J. Beusekom, T. A. Troost, L. Paltriguera, and A. Hosgor. 2015. Detecting critical choke points for achieving Good Environmental Status in European seas. Ecology and Society 20(1): 29. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-07280-200129
Coping with persistent environmental problems
Varjopuro, R., E. Andrulewicz, T. Blenckner, T. Dolch, A.-S. Heiskanen, M. Pihlajamäki, U. Steiner Brandt, M. Valman, K. Gee, T. Potts, and I. Psuty. 2014. Coping with persistent environmental problems: systemic delays in reducing eutrophication of the Baltic Sea. Ecology and Society 19(4): 48. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-06938-190448
Climate Change Negotiations
In December 2000, the United States (US) left the Kyoto Protocol on the grounds that it contained a number of fatal flaws (Chen 2003; Springer 2003; Springer and Varilek 2004).1 To many, this decision was just one of the manifestations of an enduring conflict between the US and the European Union (EU) (see e.g. Christiansen 2003, Torvanger et al. 2004, Tjernshaugen 2005). This chapter seeks to infer the main lessons of this conflict so that the f…
The implication of extreme events on policy responses
This paper considers a situation where a real risk exists that requires precautions, but the public mostly experiences the risk through infrequently occurring extreme events; this type of risk includes risk from climate change, international terrorism, natural calamities or financial crises. The analysis shows that if a risk-mitigating policy is based on the perceived riskiness of that risk, it will call for disproportionate responses (compared t…
Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU
Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU system? Several examples suggest that bureaucratic corruption exists and that the Commission’s anti-fraud agency, OLAF, is not a fully independent authority. We thus develop a novel interpretation of the principal-supervisor-agent model to cope with non-independent anti-fraud units. This model shows that corruption is likely to occur when the expected value to the client from bribing the agent is l…
Achieving Economic Growth in the EU Through Lobbyism
At Lisbon in 2000, the European Union (EU) set itself a new strategic goal, namely to become the world’s leading economy and to enhance social cohesion across the union, all within a decade. It is argued in this article that one fundamental barrier to the fulfilment of this dream is the fact that power is centralised in the Commission rather than the Parliament. The basic idea upon which our theoretical model is predicated is that a political sys…
Trawling for subsidies
In the fishing industry, fishermen traditionally have incentives to signal too many fish in the sea in order to have access to a high short-term catch level and subsidies, whereas marine biologists have incentives to signal too few fish in the sea. Marine biologists have an incentive to maximize their budgets both for altruistic reasons (to restore fish stocks) and for private reasons (by increasing demand for their services). We analyse the outc…
Bureaucrats at sea
We develop a model of bureaucratic budget catching, where bureaucracies compete for resources just like fishermen. Considering taxpayers' money a free access resource in the absence of tight fiscal control (passive sponsors), bureaucratic self-interest may induce excessive lobbying behaviour even from the perspective of the bureaucrats themselves. Our contribution is to extend the original Niskanen (1971) Niskanen, W. A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Rep…
Fighting Windmills
Actions Prior to Entering an International Environmental Agreement
This paper demonstrates how expectations about the design of regimes influence countries' actions before negotiating for agreements on international environmental problems. When a country is privately informed about own reduction costs, the preagreement emission level serves as a device to signal costs. The first main result is that private information leads to an environmentally less effective situation. Second, the distortions depend on the typ…
Fighting Windmills
Coping with persistent environmental problems
Varjopuro, R., E. Andrulewicz, T. Blenckner, T. Dolch, A.-S. Heiskanen, M. Pihlajamäki, U. Steiner Brandt, M. Valman, K. Gee, T. Potts, and I. Psuty. 2014. Coping with persistent environmental problems: systemic delays in reducing eutrophication of the Baltic Sea. Ecology and Society 19(4): 48. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-06938-190448
The implication of extreme events on policy responses
This paper considers a situation where a real risk exists that requires precautions, but the public mostly experiences the risk through infrequently occurring extreme events; this type of risk includes risk from climate change, international terrorism, natural calamities or financial crises. The analysis shows that if a risk-mitigating policy is based on the perceived riskiness of that risk, it will call for disproportionate responses (compared t…
The calculus of democratic deliberation
How robust is the welfare state when facing open borders? An evolutionary game-theoretic model
How robust is the welfare state when confronting open borders? To answer that question, we develop an evolutionary game-theoretic model combined with an ingroup–outgroup model. The simulations reveal that welfare states in general will transform into low-welfare societies unless the societies in time generate a sufficiently large amount of social recognition of the reciprocators in such a crisis. The recognition implies that the “always cooperato…
Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU
Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU system? Several examples suggest that bureaucratic corruption exists and that the Commission’s anti-fraud agency, OLAF, is not a fully independent authority. We thus develop a novel interpretation of the principal-supervisor-agent model to cope with non-independent anti-fraud units. This model shows that corruption is likely to occur when the expected value to the client from bribing the agent is l…
Trawling for subsidies
In the fishing industry, fishermen traditionally have incentives to signal too many fish in the sea in order to have access to a high short-term catch level and subsidies, whereas marine biologists have incentives to signal too few fish in the sea. Marine biologists have an incentive to maximize their budgets both for altruistic reasons (to restore fish stocks) and for private reasons (by increasing demand for their services). We analyse the outc…
Actions Prior to Entering an International Environmental Agreement
This paper demonstrates how expectations about the design of regimes influence countries' actions before negotiating for agreements on international environmental problems. When a country is privately informed about own reduction costs, the preagreement emission level serves as a device to signal costs. The first main result is that private information leads to an environmentally less effective situation. Second, the distortions depend on the typ…
Fighting Windmills
Bureaucrats at sea
We develop a model of bureaucratic budget catching, where bureaucracies compete for resources just like fishermen. Considering taxpayers' money a free access resource in the absence of tight fiscal control (passive sponsors), bureaucratic self-interest may induce excessive lobbying behaviour even from the perspective of the bureaucrats themselves. Our contribution is to extend the original Niskanen (1971) Niskanen, W. A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Rep…
Achieving Economic Growth in the EU Through Lobbyism
At Lisbon in 2000, the European Union (EU) set itself a new strategic goal, namely to become the world’s leading economy and to enhance social cohesion across the union, all within a decade. It is argued in this article that one fundamental barrier to the fulfilment of this dream is the fact that power is centralised in the Commission rather than the Parliament. The basic idea upon which our theoretical model is predicated is that a political sys…
Trawling for subsidies
In the fishing industry, fishermen traditionally have incentives to signal too many fish in the sea in order to have access to a high short-term catch level and subsidies, whereas marine biologists have incentives to signal too few fish in the sea. Marine biologists have an incentive to maximize their budgets both for altruistic reasons (to restore fish stocks) and for private reasons (by increasing demand for their services). We analyse the outc…
Climate Change Negotiations
In December 2000, the United States (US) left the Kyoto Protocol on the grounds that it contained a number of fatal flaws (Chen 2003; Springer 2003; Springer and Varilek 2004).1 To many, this decision was just one of the manifestations of an enduring conflict between the US and the European Union (EU) (see e.g. Christiansen 2003, Torvanger et al. 2004, Tjernshaugen 2005). This chapter seeks to infer the main lessons of this conflict so that the f…
The implication of extreme events on policy responses
This paper considers a situation where a real risk exists that requires precautions, but the public mostly experiences the risk through infrequently occurring extreme events; this type of risk includes risk from climate change, international terrorism, natural calamities or financial crises. The analysis shows that if a risk-mitigating policy is based on the perceived riskiness of that risk, it will call for disproportionate responses (compared t…
Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU
Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU system? Several examples suggest that bureaucratic corruption exists and that the Commission’s anti-fraud agency, OLAF, is not a fully independent authority. We thus develop a novel interpretation of the principal-supervisor-agent model to cope with non-independent anti-fraud units. This model shows that corruption is likely to occur when the expected value to the client from bribing the agent is l…
Coping with persistent environmental problems
Varjopuro, R., E. Andrulewicz, T. Blenckner, T. Dolch, A.-S. Heiskanen, M. Pihlajamäki, U. Steiner Brandt, M. Valman, K. Gee, T. Potts, and I. Psuty. 2014. Coping with persistent environmental problems: systemic delays in reducing eutrophication of the Baltic Sea. Ecology and Society 19(4): 48. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-06938-190448
Detecting critical choke points for achieving Good Environmental Status in European seas
Potts, T., T. O'Higgins, R. Brennan, S. Cinnirella, U. Steiner Brandt, J. De Vivero, J. Beusekom, T. A. Troost, L. Paltriguera, and A. Hosgor. 2015. Detecting critical choke points for achieving Good Environmental Status in European seas. Ecology and Society 20(1): 29. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-07280-200129
How robust is the welfare state when facing open borders? An evolutionary game-theoretic model
How robust is the welfare state when confronting open borders? To answer that question, we develop an evolutionary game-theoretic model combined with an ingroup–outgroup model. The simulations reveal that welfare states in general will transform into low-welfare societies unless the societies in time generate a sufficiently large amount of social recognition of the reciprocators in such a crisis. The recognition implies that the “always cooperato…
Does higher health literacy lead to higher trust in public hospitals
It is important that health care professionals understand that some patient groups have a higher chance of cooperation (e.g., agreeing on the choice of treatment) or defection (e.g. passing a complaint) than others. In perspective, future research should undertake further qualitative examinations of possible patient types and their demands in relation to different health care sectors, focusing specifically on the opportunities to improve the hand…
The calculus of democratic deliberation
Is the annual UNFCCC COP the only game in town
Is the annual United Nations framework convention on climate change meetings (UNFCCC COP) the only game in town? Are there also other possible solutions to consider? We argue that there is indeed another game, namely unilateral action facilitated by public authorities. Our theoretical model shows the conditions under which unilateral and costly technology development can be spread to other countries; that is, to an extent that makes such action o…
Can we provide appropriate tools to measure the effectiveness of climate agreements? The Paris agreement and the role of the European External Action Service
Can we provide appropriate tools to measure the effectiveness of climate agreements? How effective will, for example, the Paris Agreement be? Global emissions levels can be applied as a sole measure of performance. Current emission trends predict 2.7 degrees of temperature increase in the year 2100. The challenge rests in both the unavailability or difficulty of compiling proper data and information and the dynamic aspect which demands estimates …
The survival game
How do people survive under extreme conditions? Will selfish, non-cooperating free-rider types – the solo players – have the best chances of surviving? Or would cooperating, hard-working types – the team players – have higher chances? All morale put aside, it is interesting to know whether non-cooperation or cooperation pays off in a game characterized by scarcity and hard competition for survival. A study of people in such a Hobbesian state of n…
A comprehensive approach for assessing social flood vulnerability and social flood risk
Flood risk assessment approaches have traditionally been dominated by measures of economic damage. However, the importance of understanding the social impacts of flooding are increasingly being acknowledged. Social vulnerability indices have been constructed in diverse geographical contexts to understand relative susceptibility of different social groups to flood hazards. However, integrated assessments of social vulnerability, exposure, and haza…
Toward a third-generation rational choice theory
This paper aims to contribute to the development of a “third-generation” rational choice theory by introducing a Multiple Player Approach for analysing collective action problems. Drawing on the foundational first and second generation works of Olson (The logic of collective action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965) and Ostrom (Scand Polit Stud 23(1):3–16), we introduce five player types that we believe capture essential empirical feat…
Who faces the burden of coastal flooding? Comparing social vulnerability and flood exposure to assess distributive justice at the Danish coast
While just adaptation is quickly becoming a core concept in climate change adaptation discourse, empirical research on operationalizing justice and equity in adaptation planning remains scarce. Specifically, empirical approaches to assessing distributive justice in the context of climate change-related hazards are lacking. Thus, we often do not know how exposure to climate change-related hazards is distributed across social groups or whether vuln…
Did Ethelred the Unready make optimal choices when paying Danegeld to Svein Forkbeard? Viking Age England and game theory
King Ethelred’s repeated payments to Viking armies are often portrayed as evidence of political weakness and strategic failure. This paper reinterprets these actions within a rational choice framework, asking whether Ethelred the Unready acted optimally when paying King Svein Forkbeard to withdraw from England between 991 and 1012. Drawing on historical evidence from five documented Danegeld payments, we develop a formal model in which tribute an…
Political science (13 obras) · Economics (11 obras) · Law (9 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Geography (5 obras) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (4 obras) · Environmental Science (4 obras) · Politics (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras)