Romy Jaster
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3873231 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Romy Jaster |
| PRENOMES | Romy |
| SOBRENOME | Jaster |
| ASSINATURA | JASTER R |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 3 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 1 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 3 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2017 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Defining “Conspiracy Theory” Without Begging the Question
Generalism about conspiracy theories (CTs) is the view that CTs, as a class, are epistemically flawed. Particularists argue that each CT must be judged individually on its evidence. Both sides accuse each other of circular reasoning—of defining the term “CT” in ways that make their conclusions trivially true. This paper proposes a way out of this deadlock. In section (1), we argue that the debate is path-dependent: resolving the impasse requires …
The ability to do otherwise and the new dispositionalism
According to the new dispositionalist’s response to the Frankfurt cases, Jones can do otherwise. Black merely masks (or finks) that ability, but does not deprive Jones of it. This suggestion stands in the tradition of a line of thought according to which an informed view of the truth conditions of ability attributions allows for a compatibilist stance. The promise is that once we understand how abilities work, it turns out that the ability to do …
Dispositional accounts of abilities
This paper explores the prospects for dispositional accounts of abilities. According to so-called new dispositionalists, an agent has the ability to Φ iff they have a disposition to Φ when trying (or being otherwise properly motivated) to Φ. We show that the new dispositionalism is beset by some problems that also beset its predecessor, the conditional analysis of abilities, and bring up some further problems. We then turn to a different approach…
Dispositional accounts of abilities
This paper explores the prospects for dispositional accounts of abilities. According to so-called new dispositionalists, an agent has the ability to Φ iff they have a disposition to Φ when trying (or being otherwise properly motivated) to Φ. We show that the new dispositionalism is beset by some problems that also beset its predecessor, the conditional analysis of abilities, and bring up some further problems. We then turn to a different approach…
Dispositional accounts of abilities
This paper explores the prospects for dispositional accounts of abilities. According to so-called new dispositionalists, an agent has the ability to Φ iff they have a disposition to Φ when trying (or being otherwise properly motivated) to Φ. We show that the new dispositionalism is beset by some problems that also beset its predecessor, the conditional analysis of abilities, and bring up some further problems. We then turn to a different approach…
The ability to do otherwise and the new dispositionalism
According to the new dispositionalist’s response to the Frankfurt cases, Jones can do otherwise. Black merely masks (or finks) that ability, but does not deprive Jones of it. This suggestion stands in the tradition of a line of thought according to which an informed view of the truth conditions of ability attributions allows for a compatibilist stance. The promise is that once we understand how abilities work, it turns out that the ability to do …
Defining “Conspiracy Theory” Without Begging the Question
Generalism about conspiracy theories (CTs) is the view that CTs, as a class, are epistemically flawed. Particularists argue that each CT must be judged individually on its evidence. Both sides accuse each other of circular reasoning—of defining the term “CT” in ways that make their conclusions trivially true. This paper proposes a way out of this deadlock. In section (1), we argue that the debate is path-dependent: resolving the impasse requires …
Epistemology (2 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 obras) · Free Will and Agency (2 obras) · Philosophy (2 obras) · Psychology (2 obras) · Social Psychology (2 obras) · Attribution (1 obras) · Begging (1 obras) · Cognitive psychology (1 obras) · Compatibilism (1 obras)