Dispositional accounts of abilities

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4862792
AutoresBarbara Vetter (0000-0001-6547-6657, Freie Universität Berlin, autor correspondente), Romy Jaster (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
Ano2017
Volume12
Fascículo8
Data de publicação2017-08-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12432
OpenAlexW2744098190
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas30

This paper explores the prospects for dispositional accounts of abilities. According to so-called new dispositionalists, an agent has the ability to Φ iff they have a disposition to Φ when trying (or being otherwise properly motivated) to Φ. We show that the new dispositionalism is beset by some problems that also beset its predecessor, the conditional analysis of abilities, and bring up some further problems. We then turn to a different approach, which links abilities not to motivational states but to the notion of success, and consider ways of implementing that approach. Our results suggest that there are principled disanalogies between abilities and disposition which prevent any dispositional account of abilities from succeeding

Cognitive psychology · Disposition · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology