Jon Williamson
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3873283 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Jon Williamson |
| PRENOMES | Jon |
| SOBRENOME | Williamson |
| ASSINATURA | WILLIAMSON J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Kent |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0514-4209 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 32 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 51 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 32 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 2 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1979 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
The randomised controlled trial as cultural product
In the epistemic tradition of evidence-based medicine (EBM), the randomised controlled trial (RCT) is the best design for assessing the efficacy of an intervention. Other traditions question whether and for what questions the RCT is the “gold standard” and the extent to which the findings of other research designs should inform, complement or replace the RCT. These epistemic differences have played out in the controversy around the efficacy of fa…
How Evidential Pluralism Mitigates Epistemic Injustice in Evidence-Based Evaluation
By prioritising certain kinds of evidence and devaluing or excluding other kinds of evidence, orthodox evidence-based evaluation practice perpetuates epistemic injustice, we argue. In contrast, by advocating a more inclusive approach to evidence, Evidential Pluralism can avoid these epistemic injustices. This motivates the adoption of Evidential Pluralism as a new methodology for evaluation. These arguments are supported by case studies concernin…
When trial interventions are likely to reduce the impact of rape myths on juror decisions
Research suggests that there is, at least, a risk that problematic viewpoints about rape (and other serious sexual offences) (rape myths) are influencing decisions made by jurors in cases involving alleged sexual offending. Research has examined whether any impact of such viewpoints can be minimised through providing correct information to jurors, either through judicial directions or expert testimony. However, findings in this research appear in…
The Interplay of Data, Models, and Theories in Machine Learning
This paper discusses the role of data within scientific reasoning and as evidence for theoretical claims, arguing for the idea that data can yield theoretically grounded models and be inferred, predicted, or explained from/by such models. Contrary to Bogen and Woodward's rejection of data-to-theory and theory-to-data inferences/predictions, we draw upon artificial intelligence as applied to science literature to argue that (a) many models are rou…
Evidence and Cognition
Cognitive theorists routinely disagree about the evidence supporting claims in cognitive science. Here, we first argue that some disagreements about evidence in cognitive science are about the evidence available to be drawn upon by cognitive theorists. Then, we show that one’s explanation of why this first kind of disagreement obtains will cohere with one’s theory of evidence. We argue that the best explanation for why cognitive theorists disagre…
Individual consent in cluster randomised trials for non-pharmaceutical interventions
This paper discusses the issue of overriding the right of individual consent to participation in cluster randomised trials (CRTs). We focus on CRTs testing the efficacy of non-pharmaceutical interventions. As an example, we consider school closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Norway, a CRT was promoted as necessary for providing the best evidence to inform pandemic management policy. However, the proposal was rejected by the Norwegian Resear…
Direct Inference and Probabilistic Accounts of Induction
Schurz (2019, ch. 4) argues that probabilistic accounts of induction fail. In particular, he criticises probabilistic accounts of induction that appeal to direct inference principles, including subjective Bayesian approaches (e.g., Howson 2000) and objective Bayesian approaches (see, e.g., Williamson 2017). In this paper, I argue that Schurz’ preferred direct inference principle, namely Reichenbach’s Principle of the Narrowest Reference Class, fa…
Evidential Pluralism in the Social Sciences
This volume contends that Evidential Pluralism-an account of the epistemology of causation, which maintains that in order to establish a causal claim one needs to establish the existence of a correlation and the existence of a mechanism-can be fruitfully applied to the social sciences. Through case studies in sociology, economics, political science and law, it advances new philosophical foundations for causal enquiry in the social sciences. The b…
Evidential monism, evidential pluralism, or evidential contextualism? An introduction to evidential diversity in the social sciences
A Bayesian Account of Establishing
When a proposition is established, it can be taken as evidence for other propositions. Can the Bayesian theory of rational belief and action provide an account of establishing? I argue that it can, but only if the Bayesian is willing to endorse objective constraints on both probabilities and utilities, and willing to deny that it is rationally permissible to defer wholesale to expert opinion. I develop a new account of deference that accommodates…
Establishing the teratogenicity of Zika and evaluating causal criteria
The teratogenicity of the Zika virus was considered established in 2016, and is an interesting case because three different sets of causal criteria were used to assess teratogenicity. This paper appeals to the thesis of Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007) to devise an epistemological framework that can be used to compare and evaluate sets of causal criteria. The framework can also be used to decide when enough criteria …
The feasibility and malleability of EBM
The EBM+ programme is an attempt to improve the way in which present-day evidence-based medicine (EBM) assesses causal claims: according to EBM+, mechanistic studies should be scrutinised alongside association studies. This paper addresses two worries about EBM+: (i) that it is not feasible in practice, and (ii) that it is too malleable, i.e., its results depend on subjective choices that need to be made in order to implement the procedure. Sever…
The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference
We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument 2 Some Objections Met
Mechanisms and the Evidence Hierarchy
Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles
What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences
Calibration and Convexity
This note responds to some criticisms of my recent book In Defence of Objective Bayesianism that were provided by Gregory Wheeler in his ‘Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence’.
Causality in the Sciences
Causality in the sciences
There is a need for integrated thinking about causality, probability, and mechanism in scientific methodology. A panoply of disciplines, ranging from epidemiology and biology through to econometrics and physics, routinely make use of these concepts to infer causal relationships. But each of these disciplines has developed its own methods, where causality and probability often seem to have different understandings, and where the mechanisms involve…
Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality
Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism
Teaching & Learning Guide for
This guide accompanies the following article(s): 'Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part I.'Philosophy Compass 6/6 (2011): 421-432, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00400.x; 'Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part II.'Philosophy Compass 6/6 (2011): 433-444, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00401.xAuthor's IntroductionMechanisms are a hot topic in the philosophy of science, with a large number of papers written on mechanisms and mechanistic explanation …
Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part II
Part I of this paper introduced a range of mechanistic theories of causality, including process theories and the complex-systems theories, and some of the problems they face. Part II argues that while there is a decisive case against a purely mechanistic analysis, a viable theory of causality must incorporate mechanisms as an ingredient, and describes one way of providing an analysis of causality which reaps the rewards of the mechanistic approac…
Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part I
Part I of this paper introduces a range of mechanistic theories of causality, including process theories and the complex-systems theories, and some of the problems they face. Part II argues that while there is a decisive case against a purely mechanistic analysis, a viable theory of causality must incorporate mechanisms as an ingredient, and describes one way of providing an analysis of causality which reaps the rewards of the mechanistic approac…
In Defence of Objective Bayesianism
Objective Bayesianism is a methodological theory that is currently applied in statistics, philosophy, artificial intelligence, physics and other sciences. This book develops the formal and philosophical foundations of the theory, at a level accessible to a graduate student with some familiarity with mathematical notation.
Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability
While there are several arguments on either side, it is far from clear as to whether or not countable additivity is an acceptable axiom of subjective probability. I focus here on de Finetti's central argument against countable additivity and provide a new Dutch book proof of the principle, To argue that if we accept the Dutch book foundations of subjective probability, countable additivity is an unavoidable constraint.
Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles
Evidential Pluralism in the Social Sciences
This volume contends that Evidential Pluralism-an account of the epistemology of causation, which maintains that in order to establish a causal claim one needs to establish the existence of a correlation and the existence of a mechanism-can be fruitfully applied to the social sciences. Through case studies in sociology, economics, political science and law, it advances new philosophical foundations for causal enquiry in the social sciences. The b…
The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference
We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument 2 Some Objections Met
Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part I
Part I of this paper introduces a range of mechanistic theories of causality, including process theories and the complex-systems theories, and some of the problems they face. Part II argues that while there is a decisive case against a purely mechanistic analysis, a viable theory of causality must incorporate mechanisms as an ingredient, and describes one way of providing an analysis of causality which reaps the rewards of the mechanistic approac…
Function and organization
Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism
Objective Bayesianism with predicate languages
Inductive Influence
Objective Bayesianism has been criticised for not allowing learning from experience: it is claimed that an agent must give degree of belief 12 to the next raven being black, however many other black ravens have been observed. I argue that this objection can be overcome by appealing to objective Bayesian nets, a formalism for representing objective Bayesian degrees of belief. Under this account, previous observations exert an inductive influence o…
Evidential monism, evidential pluralism, or evidential contextualism? An introduction to evidential diversity in the social sciences
Calibration and Convexity
This note responds to some criticisms of my recent book In Defence of Objective Bayesianism that were provided by Gregory Wheeler in his ‘Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence’.
Action Theory and Social Science
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Action Theory and Social Science. By Ingmar Pörn. (Dordrecht: Reidel. 1978. Pp. 129.) J. Williamson J. Williamson Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 29, Issue 116, July 1979, Pages 282–284, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218836 Published: 01 July 1979
Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability
While there are several arguments on either side, it is far from clear as to whether or not countable additivity is an acceptable axiom of subjective probability. I focus here on de Finetti's central argument against countable additivity and provide a new Dutch book proof of the principle, To argue that if we accept the Dutch book foundations of subjective probability, countable additivity is an unavoidable constraint.
Bayesian Nets and Causality
Bayesian nets and causality
Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences
We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences—pluralism about causality will not do either. Instea…
Inductive Influence
Objective Bayesianism has been criticised for not allowing learning from experience: it is claimed that an agent must give degree of belief 12 to the next raven being black, however many other black ravens have been observed. I argue that this objection can be overcome by appealing to objective Bayesian nets, a formalism for representing objective Bayesian degrees of belief. Under this account, previous observations exert an inductive influence o…
Objective Bayesianism with predicate languages
Response to Glymour
In Defence of Objective Bayesianism
Objective Bayesianism is a methodological theory that is currently applied in statistics, philosophy, artificial intelligence, physics and other sciences. This book develops the formal and philosophical foundations of the theory, at a level accessible to a graduate student with some familiarity with mathematical notation.
Function and organization
Causality in the Sciences
Causality in the sciences
There is a need for integrated thinking about causality, probability, and mechanism in scientific methodology. A panoply of disciplines, ranging from epidemiology and biology through to econometrics and physics, routinely make use of these concepts to infer causal relationships. But each of these disciplines has developed its own methods, where causality and probability often seem to have different understandings, and where the mechanisms involve…
Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality
Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism
Teaching & Learning Guide for
This guide accompanies the following article(s): 'Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part I.'Philosophy Compass 6/6 (2011): 421-432, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00400.x; 'Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part II.'Philosophy Compass 6/6 (2011): 433-444, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00401.xAuthor's IntroductionMechanisms are a hot topic in the philosophy of science, with a large number of papers written on mechanisms and mechanistic explanation …
Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part II
Part I of this paper introduced a range of mechanistic theories of causality, including process theories and the complex-systems theories, and some of the problems they face. Part II argues that while there is a decisive case against a purely mechanistic analysis, a viable theory of causality must incorporate mechanisms as an ingredient, and describes one way of providing an analysis of causality which reaps the rewards of the mechanistic approac…
Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part I
Part I of this paper introduces a range of mechanistic theories of causality, including process theories and the complex-systems theories, and some of the problems they face. Part II argues that while there is a decisive case against a purely mechanistic analysis, a viable theory of causality must incorporate mechanisms as an ingredient, and describes one way of providing an analysis of causality which reaps the rewards of the mechanistic approac…
What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences
Calibration and Convexity
This note responds to some criticisms of my recent book In Defence of Objective Bayesianism that were provided by Gregory Wheeler in his ‘Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence’.
Mechanisms and the Evidence Hierarchy
Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles
The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference
We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument 2 Some Objections Met
The feasibility and malleability of EBM
The EBM+ programme is an attempt to improve the way in which present-day evidence-based medicine (EBM) assesses causal claims: according to EBM+, mechanistic studies should be scrutinised alongside association studies. This paper addresses two worries about EBM+: (i) that it is not feasible in practice, and (ii) that it is too malleable, i.e., its results depend on subjective choices that need to be made in order to implement the procedure. Sever…
Establishing the teratogenicity of Zika and evaluating causal criteria
The teratogenicity of the Zika virus was considered established in 2016, and is an interesting case because three different sets of causal criteria were used to assess teratogenicity. This paper appeals to the thesis of Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007) to devise an epistemological framework that can be used to compare and evaluate sets of causal criteria. The framework can also be used to decide when enough criteria …
Evidential monism, evidential pluralism, or evidential contextualism? An introduction to evidential diversity in the social sciences
Epistemology (27 obras) · Philosophy (27 obras) · Computer Science (22 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (19 obras) · Mathematics (13 obras) · Psychology (13 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (10 obras) · Philosophy of science (10 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 obras) · Bayesian probability (8 obras)