The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8398763
AutoresJames Hawthorne (University of Kent, autor correspondente), J Landes (0000-0003-3105-6624, University of Oklahoma), Christian Wallmann (0009-0006-0612-5877, University of Kent), Jon Williamson (0000-0003-0514-4209, University of Oklahoma)
Ano2017
Volume68
Fascículo1
Páginas123-131
Data de publicação2017-03-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axv030
OpenAlexW2216306377
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas3

We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument 2 Some Objections Met

Appeal · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Political science · Principal (computer security) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy