Daniel Arce
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4029539 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Daniel Arce |
| PRENOMES | Daniel |
| SOBRENOME | Arce |
| ASSINATURA | ARCE D |
| AFILIAÇÕES | The University of Texas at Dallas |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1702-4570 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 37 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2007 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2020 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Terrorist training
On the human consequences of terrorism
Terrorist attacks are regarded as low-probability, highly consequential events. What, exactly, are the significant effects of terrorism? This paper presents a cross-sectional depiction of the death and injury profiles for nine of the most violent terrorism tactics: six types of bombings, mass shootings, combined shootings and explosions, and intentional vehicular assaults. By constructing a composite injury and death profile for each tactic under…
On the cooperative and competitive aspects of strategic monitoring
Strategic monitoring occurs in myriad situations such as principal-agent relationships, law enforcement and treaty verification. Such situations are generally known as enforcement or inspection games, with the focus largely being on the (counterintuitive) properties of their associated mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. This article instead characterizes the cooperative resolution of the mixed motives of the players involved. It does so through an …
Motivating operatives for suicide missions and conventional terrorist attacks
We investigate the problem of motivating terrorist operatives for suicide missions and conventional terrorist attacks when operatives have either self-interested or social preferences that are not observable by the terrorist organization. We characterize the screening mechanism for selecting operatives according to their social preferences and determine under what conditions a terrorist group will prefer to utilize suicide versus conventional tac…
A Vintage Model of Terrorist Organizations
A dynamic model of a terrorist organization is presented with the defining feature being that a succession of operatives is recruited at different points in time. Consequently, a government’s counterterror policy must be tailored according to the vintage structure of the terrorist group that it faces. This implies that past history of counterterror policy and attacks matter for the formulation of current and future policy. The authors present the…
Counterterrorism strategies in the lab
Terrorism experiments
Experimental research has a long-established tradition in psychology and sociology, and a more recent but important history as a useful methodology in economics. In this article, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of experiments as a method for studying terrorism and other national security topics. For example, given the paucity of data on counterterror policy decisions by governments, as well as for planning, targeting and selecting methods…
Terrorist Spectaculars
This article presents a signaling model of terrorist attacks, where the target government faces a trade-off from its counterterrorism responses and the backlash (counterreaction) that such responses incite. An endogenous characterization of terrorist spectaculars is specified, given a government’s counterterrorism stance and the potential for backlash attacks. In particular, spectacular attacks are pooling, rather than separating, phenomena, wher…
Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence
This article presents a model of terrorist attacks as signals where the government is uncertain as to whether it is facing a group that is politically motivated or militant. Pooling equilibriums result with two types of ex post regret: P-regret, where the government concedes to political types that would not subsequently attack; and M-regret, where the government does not concede to militant types that subsequently attack at greater levels. Avoid…
Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence
This article presents a model of terrorist attacks as signals where the government is uncertain as to whether it is facing a group that is politically motivated or militant. Pooling equilibriums result with two types of ex post regret: P-regret, where the government concedes to political types that would not subsequently attack; and M-regret, where the government does not concede to militant types that subsequently attack at greater levels. Avoid…
Terrorist Spectaculars
This article presents a signaling model of terrorist attacks, where the target government faces a trade-off from its counterterrorism responses and the backlash (counterreaction) that such responses incite. An endogenous characterization of terrorist spectaculars is specified, given a government’s counterterrorism stance and the potential for backlash attacks. In particular, spectacular attacks are pooling, rather than separating, phenomena, wher…
On the human consequences of terrorism
Terrorist attacks are regarded as low-probability, highly consequential events. What, exactly, are the significant effects of terrorism? This paper presents a cross-sectional depiction of the death and injury profiles for nine of the most violent terrorism tactics: six types of bombings, mass shootings, combined shootings and explosions, and intentional vehicular assaults. By constructing a composite injury and death profile for each tactic under…
Terrorism experiments
Experimental research has a long-established tradition in psychology and sociology, and a more recent but important history as a useful methodology in economics. In this article, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of experiments as a method for studying terrorism and other national security topics. For example, given the paucity of data on counterterror policy decisions by governments, as well as for planning, targeting and selecting methods…
A Vintage Model of Terrorist Organizations
A dynamic model of a terrorist organization is presented with the defining feature being that a succession of operatives is recruited at different points in time. Consequently, a government’s counterterror policy must be tailored according to the vintage structure of the terrorist group that it faces. This implies that past history of counterterror policy and attacks matter for the formulation of current and future policy. The authors present the…
Counterterrorism strategies in the lab
Motivating operatives for suicide missions and conventional terrorist attacks
We investigate the problem of motivating terrorist operatives for suicide missions and conventional terrorist attacks when operatives have either self-interested or social preferences that are not observable by the terrorist organization. We characterize the screening mechanism for selecting operatives according to their social preferences and determine under what conditions a terrorist group will prefer to utilize suicide versus conventional tac…
Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence
This article presents a model of terrorist attacks as signals where the government is uncertain as to whether it is facing a group that is politically motivated or militant. Pooling equilibriums result with two types of ex post regret: P-regret, where the government concedes to political types that would not subsequently attack; and M-regret, where the government does not concede to militant types that subsequently attack at greater levels. Avoid…
Terrorist Spectaculars
This article presents a signaling model of terrorist attacks, where the target government faces a trade-off from its counterterrorism responses and the backlash (counterreaction) that such responses incite. An endogenous characterization of terrorist spectaculars is specified, given a government’s counterterrorism stance and the potential for backlash attacks. In particular, spectacular attacks are pooling, rather than separating, phenomena, wher…
Counterterrorism strategies in the lab
Terrorism experiments
Experimental research has a long-established tradition in psychology and sociology, and a more recent but important history as a useful methodology in economics. In this article, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of experiments as a method for studying terrorism and other national security topics. For example, given the paucity of data on counterterror policy decisions by governments, as well as for planning, targeting and selecting methods…
A Vintage Model of Terrorist Organizations
A dynamic model of a terrorist organization is presented with the defining feature being that a succession of operatives is recruited at different points in time. Consequently, a government’s counterterror policy must be tailored according to the vintage structure of the terrorist group that it faces. This implies that past history of counterterror policy and attacks matter for the formulation of current and future policy. The authors present the…
Motivating operatives for suicide missions and conventional terrorist attacks
We investigate the problem of motivating terrorist operatives for suicide missions and conventional terrorist attacks when operatives have either self-interested or social preferences that are not observable by the terrorist organization. We characterize the screening mechanism for selecting operatives according to their social preferences and determine under what conditions a terrorist group will prefer to utilize suicide versus conventional tac…
On the cooperative and competitive aspects of strategic monitoring
Strategic monitoring occurs in myriad situations such as principal-agent relationships, law enforcement and treaty verification. Such situations are generally known as enforcement or inspection games, with the focus largely being on the (counterintuitive) properties of their associated mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. This article instead characterizes the cooperative resolution of the mixed motives of the players involved. It does so through an …
On the human consequences of terrorism
Terrorist attacks are regarded as low-probability, highly consequential events. What, exactly, are the significant effects of terrorism? This paper presents a cross-sectional depiction of the death and injury profiles for nine of the most violent terrorism tactics: six types of bombings, mass shootings, combined shootings and explosions, and intentional vehicular assaults. By constructing a composite injury and death profile for each tactic under…
Terrorist training
Law (9 obras) · Political science (9 obras) · Terrorism (7 obras) · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Computer security (6 obras) · Economics (6 obras) · Law (6 obras) · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance (4 obras) · Criminology (4 obras)