Terrorist Spectaculars
Backlash Attacks and the Focus of Intelligence
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6285249 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Daniel G Arce (School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson), Daniel Arce (0000-0003-1702-4570, The University of Texas at Dallas), Tod Sandler (0000-0001-9077-5915, School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson,, autor correspondente), Todd Sandler |
| Ano | 2010 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 354-373 |
| Data de publicação | 2010-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editora | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002709355414 |
| OpenAlex | W2160001133 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 13 |
| Referências citadas | 21 |
This article presents a signaling model of terrorist attacks, where the target government faces a trade-off from its counterterrorism responses and the backlash (counterreaction) that such responses incite. An endogenous characterization of terrorist spectaculars is specified, given a government’s counterterrorism stance and the potential for backlash attacks. In particular, spectacular attacks are pooling, rather than separating, phenomena, whereby the government cannot discern, based on past attacks, the militancy of the terrorist group. The definition for ‘‘spectacular’’ terrorist attacks is inversely related to the government’s toughness and its belief that it confronts a militant group. Policy recommendations are specified for non-event-specific intelligence in relation to the avoidance of spectacular attacks or unnecessary concessions. Intelligence must be focused on the propensity for counterterrorism to give rise to a backlash attack
Backlash · Computer security · Criminology · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Militant · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Pooling · Sociology · Terrorism · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Target Hardening and Terrorist Signaling
Do 90 Percent of Terrorist Groups Last Less than a Year? Updating the Conventional Wisdom
What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11
The Political Economy of Terrorism
European Union, transnational terrorism and the strategic choice of counterterrorism policies in democratic countries
The local geography of transnational terrorism
Countering Boko Haram’s Violence
A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers
National Responses to Transnational Terrorism
Knowing one’s future preferences
Terrorism and Policy
Terrorist attack and target diversity
Terrorism experiments
The Political Economy of Terrorism
Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack
Commentary
The Strategies of Terrorism
Why Terrorism Does Not Work
Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings in (Counter-) Terror Games
Counterterrorism
Too Much of a Good Thing
On the Duration and Sustainability of Transnational Terrorist Organizations
The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources
Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence
Terrorist Signalling and the Value of Intelligence
WMD terrorism and US intelligence collection
| Obras citantes distintas | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,65 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2006 - 2022 (17) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 11 |