Uwe Peters
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4569999 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Uwe Peters |
| PRENOMES | Uwe |
| SOBRENOME | Peters |
| ASSINATURA | PETERS U |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Bonn |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7103-3921 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 19 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2020 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Generics in science communication
that is, unquantified statements about whole categories of people or phenomena, when communicating research findings (e.g. "statins reduce cardiovascular events"). Large language models, such as ChatGPT, frequently adopt the same style when summarizing scientific texts. However, generics can prompt overgeneralizations, especially when they are interpreted differently across audiences. In a study comparing laypeople, scientists, and two leading la…
Epistemic Challenges Faced by Non-native English Speakers in Philosophy
The widespread use of English in the field of philosophy facilitates international collaboration but may also pose significant challenges in understanding, analyzing, or producing information for both native (NES) and non-native English speakers (NNES). These challenges have not yet been systematically investigated. We conducted an international survey of philosophers ( N = 1,615), comparing NES and NNES, while controlling for their academic posi…
The philosophical debate on linguistic bias
Drawing on empirical findings, a number of philosophers have recently argued that people who use English as a foreign language may face a linguistic bias in academia in that they or their contributions may be perceived more negatively than warranted because of their English.I take a critical look at this argument.I first distinguish different phenomena that may be conceptualized as linguistic bias but that should be kept separate to avoid overgen…
Are generics and negativity about social groups common on social media? A comparative analysis of Twitter (X) data
Many philosophers hold that generics (i.e., unquantified generalizations) are pervasive in communication and that when they are about social groups, this may offend and polarize people because generics gloss over variations between individuals. Generics about social groups might be particularly common on Twitter (X). This remains unexplored, however. Using machine learning (ML) techniques, we therefore developed an automatic classifier for social…
Hasty Generalizations Are Pervasive in Experimental Philosophy
Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that stu…
Extended Implicit Bias
It has recently been argued that to tackle social injustice, implicit biases and unjust social structures should be targeted equally because they sustain and ontologically overlap with each other. Here I develop this thought further by relating it to the hypothesis of extended cognition. I argue that if we accept common conditions for extended cognition then people’s implicit biases are often partly realized by and so extended into unjust social …
Values in science
Social and medical scientists frequently produce empirical generalizations that involve concepts partly defined by value judgments. These generalizations, which have been called ‘mixed claims’, raise interesting questions. Does the presence of them in science imply that science is value-laden? Is the value-ladenness of mixed claims special compared to other kinds of value-ladenness of science? Do we lose epistemically if we reformulate these clai…
Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms
When scientists or science reporters communicate research results to the public, this often involves ethical and epistemic risks. One such risk arises when scientific claims cause cognitive or behavioural changes in the audience that contribute to the self-fulfilment of these claims. I argue that the ethical and epistemic problems that such self-fulfilment effects may pose are much broader and more common than hitherto appreciated. Moreover, thes…
Reclaiming Control
It is well known that on the Internet, computer algorithms track our website browsing, clicks, and search history to infer our preferences, interests, and goals. The nature of this algorithmic tracking remains unclear, however. Does it involve what many cognitive scientists and philosophers call ‘mindreading’, (i.e., an epistemic capacity to attribute mental states to people to predict, explain, or influence their actions)? Here I argue that it d…
Objectivity, perceptual constancy, and teleology in young children
Can young children such as 3‐year‐olds represent the world objectively? Some prominent developmental psychologists—such as Perner and Tomasello—assume so. I argue that this view is susceptible to a prima facie powerful objection: To represent objectively, one must be able to represent not only features of the entities represented but also features of objectification itself, which 3‐year‐olds cannot do yet. Drawing on Burge's work on perceptual co…
What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To offer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing…
Algorithmic Political Bias Can Reduce Political Polarization
Does algorithmic political bias contribute to an entrenchment and polarization of political positions? Franke ( Philosophy and Technology , 35, 7, 2022) argues that it may do so because the bias involves classifications of people as liberals, conservatives, etc., and individuals often conform to the ways in which they are classified. I provide a novel example of this phenomenon in human–computer interactions and introduce a social psychological m…
Algorithmic Political Bias in Artificial Intelligence Systems
Some artificial intelligence (AI) systems can display algorithmic bias, i.e. they may produce outputs that unfairly discriminate against people based on their social identity. Much research on this topic focuses on algorithmic bias that disadvantages people based on their gender or racial identity. The related ethical problems are significant and well known. Algorithmic bias against other aspects of people’s social identity, for instance, their p…
How (many) descriptive claims about political polarization exacerbate polarization
Recently, researchers and reporters have made a wide range of claims about the distribution, nature, and societal impact of political polarization. Here I offer reasons to believe that even when they are correct and prima facie merely descriptive, many of these claims have the highly negative side effect of increasing political polarization. This is because of the interplay of two factors that have so far been neglected in the work on political p…
An argument for egalitarian confirmation bias and against political diversity in academia
It has recently been suggested that politically motivated cognition leads progressive individuals (e.g., liberals) to form beliefs that underestimate real differences between social groups (e.g., in academic performance) and to process information selectively to support these beliefs and an egalitarian outlook. I contend that this tendency, which I shall call ‘egalitarian confirmation bias’, is often ‘Mandevillian’ in nature. That is, while it is…
Teleology and mentalizing in the explanation of action
In empirically informed research on action explanation, philosophers and developmental psychologists have recently proposed a teleological account of the way in which we make sense of people’s intentional behavior. It holds that we typically don’t explain an agent’s action by appealing to her mental states but by referring to the objective, publically accessible facts of the world that count in favor of performing the action so as to achieve a ce…
Weighing the costs
‘No-platforming’—the practice of denying someone the opportunity to express their opinion at certain venues because of the perceived abhorrent or misguided nature of their view(s)—is a hot topic. Several philosophers have advanced epistemic reasons for using the policy in certain cases. Here we introduce epistemic considerations against no-platforming that are relevant for the reflection on the cases at issue. We then contend that three recent ep…
Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science
The proposal that values in science are illegitimate and that they should be counteracted whenever they direct inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions is not uncommon in the philosophy of science. Drawing on recent research from cognitive science on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reli…
Ideological diversity, hostility, and discrimination in philosophy
Members of the field of philosophy have, just as other people, political convictions or, as psychologists call them, ideologies. How are different ideologies distributed and perceived in the field? Using the familiar distinction between the political left and right, we surveyed an international sample of 794 subjects in philosophy. We found that survey participants clearly leaned left (75%), while right-leaning individuals (14%) and moderates (11…
Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science
The proposal that values in science are illegitimate and that they should be counteracted whenever they direct inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions is not uncommon in the philosophy of science. Drawing on recent research from cognitive science on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reli…
How (many) descriptive claims about political polarization exacerbate polarization
Recently, researchers and reporters have made a wide range of claims about the distribution, nature, and societal impact of political polarization. Here I offer reasons to believe that even when they are correct and prima facie merely descriptive, many of these claims have the highly negative side effect of increasing political polarization. This is because of the interplay of two factors that have so far been neglected in the work on political p…
Hasty Generalizations Are Pervasive in Experimental Philosophy
Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that stu…
Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms
When scientists or science reporters communicate research results to the public, this often involves ethical and epistemic risks. One such risk arises when scientific claims cause cognitive or behavioural changes in the audience that contribute to the self-fulfilment of these claims. I argue that the ethical and epistemic problems that such self-fulfilment effects may pose are much broader and more common than hitherto appreciated. Moreover, thes…
An argument for egalitarian confirmation bias and against political diversity in academia
It has recently been suggested that politically motivated cognition leads progressive individuals (e.g., liberals) to form beliefs that underestimate real differences between social groups (e.g., in academic performance) and to process information selectively to support these beliefs and an egalitarian outlook. I contend that this tendency, which I shall call ‘egalitarian confirmation bias’, is often ‘Mandevillian’ in nature. That is, while it is…
Ideological diversity, hostility, and discrimination in philosophy
Members of the field of philosophy have, just as other people, political convictions or, as psychologists call them, ideologies. How are different ideologies distributed and perceived in the field? Using the familiar distinction between the political left and right, we surveyed an international sample of 794 subjects in philosophy. We found that survey participants clearly leaned left (75%), while right-leaning individuals (14%) and moderates (11…
How (many) descriptive claims about political polarization exacerbate polarization
Recently, researchers and reporters have made a wide range of claims about the distribution, nature, and societal impact of political polarization. Here I offer reasons to believe that even when they are correct and prima facie merely descriptive, many of these claims have the highly negative side effect of increasing political polarization. This is because of the interplay of two factors that have so far been neglected in the work on political p…
An argument for egalitarian confirmation bias and against political diversity in academia
It has recently been suggested that politically motivated cognition leads progressive individuals (e.g., liberals) to form beliefs that underestimate real differences between social groups (e.g., in academic performance) and to process information selectively to support these beliefs and an egalitarian outlook. I contend that this tendency, which I shall call ‘egalitarian confirmation bias’, is often ‘Mandevillian’ in nature. That is, while it is…
Teleology and mentalizing in the explanation of action
In empirically informed research on action explanation, philosophers and developmental psychologists have recently proposed a teleological account of the way in which we make sense of people’s intentional behavior. It holds that we typically don’t explain an agent’s action by appealing to her mental states but by referring to the objective, publically accessible facts of the world that count in favor of performing the action so as to achieve a ce…
Weighing the costs
‘No-platforming’—the practice of denying someone the opportunity to express their opinion at certain venues because of the perceived abhorrent or misguided nature of their view(s)—is a hot topic. Several philosophers have advanced epistemic reasons for using the policy in certain cases. Here we introduce epistemic considerations against no-platforming that are relevant for the reflection on the cases at issue. We then contend that three recent ep…
Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science
The proposal that values in science are illegitimate and that they should be counteracted whenever they direct inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions is not uncommon in the philosophy of science. Drawing on recent research from cognitive science on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reli…
Reclaiming Control
It is well known that on the Internet, computer algorithms track our website browsing, clicks, and search history to infer our preferences, interests, and goals. The nature of this algorithmic tracking remains unclear, however. Does it involve what many cognitive scientists and philosophers call ‘mindreading’, (i.e., an epistemic capacity to attribute mental states to people to predict, explain, or influence their actions)? Here I argue that it d…
Objectivity, perceptual constancy, and teleology in young children
Can young children such as 3‐year‐olds represent the world objectively? Some prominent developmental psychologists—such as Perner and Tomasello—assume so. I argue that this view is susceptible to a prima facie powerful objection: To represent objectively, one must be able to represent not only features of the entities represented but also features of objectification itself, which 3‐year‐olds cannot do yet. Drawing on Burge's work on perceptual co…
What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To offer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing…
Algorithmic Political Bias Can Reduce Political Polarization
Does algorithmic political bias contribute to an entrenchment and polarization of political positions? Franke ( Philosophy and Technology , 35, 7, 2022) argues that it may do so because the bias involves classifications of people as liberals, conservatives, etc., and individuals often conform to the ways in which they are classified. I provide a novel example of this phenomenon in human–computer interactions and introduce a social psychological m…
Algorithmic Political Bias in Artificial Intelligence Systems
Some artificial intelligence (AI) systems can display algorithmic bias, i.e. they may produce outputs that unfairly discriminate against people based on their social identity. Much research on this topic focuses on algorithmic bias that disadvantages people based on their gender or racial identity. The related ethical problems are significant and well known. Algorithmic bias against other aspects of people’s social identity, for instance, their p…
Extended Implicit Bias
It has recently been argued that to tackle social injustice, implicit biases and unjust social structures should be targeted equally because they sustain and ontologically overlap with each other. Here I develop this thought further by relating it to the hypothesis of extended cognition. I argue that if we accept common conditions for extended cognition then people’s implicit biases are often partly realized by and so extended into unjust social …
Values in science
Social and medical scientists frequently produce empirical generalizations that involve concepts partly defined by value judgments. These generalizations, which have been called ‘mixed claims’, raise interesting questions. Does the presence of them in science imply that science is value-laden? Is the value-ladenness of mixed claims special compared to other kinds of value-ladenness of science? Do we lose epistemically if we reformulate these clai…
Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms
When scientists or science reporters communicate research results to the public, this often involves ethical and epistemic risks. One such risk arises when scientific claims cause cognitive or behavioural changes in the audience that contribute to the self-fulfilment of these claims. I argue that the ethical and epistemic problems that such self-fulfilment effects may pose are much broader and more common than hitherto appreciated. Moreover, thes…
The philosophical debate on linguistic bias
Drawing on empirical findings, a number of philosophers have recently argued that people who use English as a foreign language may face a linguistic bias in academia in that they or their contributions may be perceived more negatively than warranted because of their English.I take a critical look at this argument.I first distinguish different phenomena that may be conceptualized as linguistic bias but that should be kept separate to avoid overgen…
Are generics and negativity about social groups common on social media? A comparative analysis of Twitter (X) data
Many philosophers hold that generics (i.e., unquantified generalizations) are pervasive in communication and that when they are about social groups, this may offend and polarize people because generics gloss over variations between individuals. Generics about social groups might be particularly common on Twitter (X). This remains unexplored, however. Using machine learning (ML) techniques, we therefore developed an automatic classifier for social…
Hasty Generalizations Are Pervasive in Experimental Philosophy
Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that stu…
Epistemic Challenges Faced by Non-native English Speakers in Philosophy
The widespread use of English in the field of philosophy facilitates international collaboration but may also pose significant challenges in understanding, analyzing, or producing information for both native (NES) and non-native English speakers (NNES). These challenges have not yet been systematically investigated. We conducted an international survey of philosophers ( N = 1,615), comparing NES and NNES, while controlling for their academic posi…
Generics in science communication
that is, unquantified statements about whole categories of people or phenomena, when communicating research findings (e.g. "statins reduce cardiovascular events"). Large language models, such as ChatGPT, frequently adopt the same style when summarizing scientific texts. However, generics can prompt overgeneralizations, especially when they are interpreted differently across audiences. In a study comparing laypeople, scientists, and two leading la…
Epistemology (13 obras) · Philosophy (13 obras) · Psychology (13 obras) · Political science (9 obras) · Sociology (9 obras) · Law (8 obras) · Philosophy of science (8 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (8 obras) · Social Psychology (8 obras) · Politics (6 obras)