Values in science

Assessing the case for mixed claims

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21335751
AutoresUwe Peters (0000-0002-7103-3921, University of Southern Denmark, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Volume66
Fascículo6
Páginas965-976
Data de publicação2023-07-03
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoInquiry (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2020.1712235
OpenAlexW2998749558
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas15

Social and medical scientists frequently produce empirical generalizations that involve concepts partly defined by value judgments. These generalizations, which have been called ‘mixed claims’, raise interesting questions. Does the presence of them in science imply that science is value-laden? Is the value-ladenness of mixed claims special compared to other kinds of value-ladenness of science? Do we lose epistemically if we reformulate these claims as conditional statements? And if we want to allow mixed claims in science, do we need a new account of how to reconcile values with objectivity? Alexandrova (2017 Alexandrova, A. 2017. A Philosophy of the Science of Well-Being. New York: OUP.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]. A Philosophy of the Science of Well-being. New York: OUP, 2018 Alexandrova, A. 2018. “Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2): 421–445.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2): 421–445) offers affirmative answers to these questions. In responding to Alexandrova’s arguments, this short discussion note motivates negative ones and in doing so casts new light on mixed claims

Actuarial science · Economics · Law and economics · Political science · Positive economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy and History of Science