Davide Fassio
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 5722955 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Davide Fassio |
| PRENOMES | Davide |
| SOBRENOME | Fassio |
| ASSINATURA | FASSIO D |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Zhejiang University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9233-5868 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 12 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 2 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2011 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Asserting, Knowing and Being Sure
It has been argued that assertion is governed by both a knowledge norm and a surety norm. According to a standard view (Unger, 1975; Williamson, 2000), the knowledge norm is more fundamental. The surety norm can be derived from the knowledge norm. This orthodoxy has recently been challenged. Goodman and Holguin (2022) have argued for an alternative picture in which the surety norm is more fundamental. The knowledge norm can be derived from the su…
On danger
The notion of danger is ubiquitous in our everyday practical judgments. Yet discussions of danger and its normative role in guiding our actions are rare in contemporary philosophy. This could be partially explained by the frequent conflation of danger with risk. This paper aims to address this gap by clarifying what danger is and how it differs from risk. Drawing on various conceptual, linguistic, and formal considerations, I argue against standa…
Self-Effacing Reasons and Epistemic Constraints
A minimal constraint on normative reasons seems to be that if some fact is a reason for an agent to φ (act, believe, or feel), the agent could come to know that fact. This constraint is threatened by a well-known type of counterexamples. Self-effacing reasons are facts that intuitively constitute reasons for an agent to φ, but that if they were to become known, they would cease to be reasons for that agent. The challenge posed by self-effacing re…
Justification and gradability
What the doctor should do
Perspectivism, Accessibility and the Failure of Conjunction Agglomeration
Potential perspectivism is the view that what an agent ought to do (believe, like, fear, ... ) depends primarily on facts that are potentially available to her. I consider a challenge to this view. Potentially accessible facts do not always agglomerate over conjunction. This implies that one can fail to have relevant access to a set of facts as a whole but have access to proper subsets of it, each of which can support different incompatible respo…
Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory
Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence
According to the Rational Threshold View, a rational agent believes p if and only if her credence in p is equal to or greater than a certain threshold. One of the most serious challenges for this view is the problem of statistical evidence : statistical evidence is often not sufficient to make an outright belief rational, no matter how probable the target proposition is given such evidence. This indicates that rational belief is not as sensitive …
On the generality argument for the knowledge norm
Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief
According to a popular view in contemporary epistemology, a belief is justified if, and only if, it amounts to knowledge. Upholders of this view also hold that knowledge is the fundamental norm governing belief and that conforming to this norm is both necessary and sufficient for justification. I argue against the claim that mere norm conformity is sufficient for justification. Rather, justification requires norm conformity for sufficient undefea…
La connaissance et ses raisons
Cet ouvrage est le produit des premiers travaux du Groupe de Recherche en Épistémologie (GRÉ), porté par Claudine Tiercelin au sein de la chaire de Métaphysique et philosophie de la connaissance du Collège de France. Les textes qui s’y trouvent réunis traitent de questions particulièrement discutées de l’épistémologie contemporaine, entendue comme élucidation philosophique de la nature de la connaissance, de sa valeur et de ses modalités, ainsi q…
Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed
The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument to the effect that, if there are truths not actually known, then there are unknowable truths. Recently, Alexander Paseau and Bernard Linsky have independently suggested a possible way to counter this argument by typing knowledge. In this article, we argue against their proposal that if one abstracts from other possible independent considerations supporting reasons for typing knowledge and considers th…
Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed
The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument to the effect that, if there are truths not actually known, then there are unknowable truths. Recently, Alexander Paseau and Bernard Linsky have independently suggested a possible way to counter this argument by typing knowledge. In this article, we argue against their proposal that if one abstracts from other possible independent considerations supporting reasons for typing knowledge and considers th…
La connaissance et ses raisons
Cet ouvrage est le produit des premiers travaux du Groupe de Recherche en Épistémologie (GRÉ), porté par Claudine Tiercelin au sein de la chaire de Métaphysique et philosophie de la connaissance du Collège de France. Les textes qui s’y trouvent réunis traitent de questions particulièrement discutées de l’épistémologie contemporaine, entendue comme élucidation philosophique de la nature de la connaissance, de sa valeur et de ses modalités, ainsi q…
Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence
According to the Rational Threshold View, a rational agent believes p if and only if her credence in p is equal to or greater than a certain threshold. One of the most serious challenges for this view is the problem of statistical evidence : statistical evidence is often not sufficient to make an outright belief rational, no matter how probable the target proposition is given such evidence. This indicates that rational belief is not as sensitive …
On the generality argument for the knowledge norm
Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief
According to a popular view in contemporary epistemology, a belief is justified if, and only if, it amounts to knowledge. Upholders of this view also hold that knowledge is the fundamental norm governing belief and that conforming to this norm is both necessary and sufficient for justification. I argue against the claim that mere norm conformity is sufficient for justification. Rather, justification requires norm conformity for sufficient undefea…
Perspectivism, Accessibility and the Failure of Conjunction Agglomeration
Potential perspectivism is the view that what an agent ought to do (believe, like, fear, ... ) depends primarily on facts that are potentially available to her. I consider a challenge to this view. Potentially accessible facts do not always agglomerate over conjunction. This implies that one can fail to have relevant access to a set of facts as a whole but have access to proper subsets of it, each of which can support different incompatible respo…
Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory
What the doctor should do
Justification and gradability
Self-Effacing Reasons and Epistemic Constraints
A minimal constraint on normative reasons seems to be that if some fact is a reason for an agent to φ (act, believe, or feel), the agent could come to know that fact. This constraint is threatened by a well-known type of counterexamples. Self-effacing reasons are facts that intuitively constitute reasons for an agent to φ, but that if they were to become known, they would cease to be reasons for that agent. The challenge posed by self-effacing re…
Asserting, Knowing and Being Sure
It has been argued that assertion is governed by both a knowledge norm and a surety norm. According to a standard view (Unger, 1975; Williamson, 2000), the knowledge norm is more fundamental. The surety norm can be derived from the knowledge norm. This orthodoxy has recently been challenged. Goodman and Holguin (2022) have argued for an alternative picture in which the surety norm is more fundamental. The knowledge norm can be derived from the su…
On danger
The notion of danger is ubiquitous in our everyday practical judgments. Yet discussions of danger and its normative role in guiding our actions are rare in contemporary philosophy. This could be partially explained by the frequent conflation of danger with risk. This paper aims to address this gap by clarifying what danger is and how it differs from risk. Drawing on various conceptual, linguistic, and formal considerations, I argue against standa…
Philosophy (12 obras) · Epistemology (11 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (11 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 obras) · Free Will and Agency (4 obras) · Mathematics (4 obras) · Metaphysics (4 obras) · Philosophy of language (4 obras) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (3 obras) · Philosophy of science (3 obras)