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Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9687444
AutoresDavide Fassio (0000-0001-9233-5868, Zhejiang University, autor correspondente)
Ano2020
Volume59
Fascículo3
Páginas497-525
Data de publicação2020-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoDialogue (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217318000653
OpenAlexW2908683409
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas58

According to a popular view in contemporary epistemology, a belief is justified if, and only if, it amounts to knowledge. Upholders of this view also hold that knowledge is the fundamental norm governing belief and that conforming to this norm is both necessary and sufficient for justification. I argue against the claim that mere norm conformity is sufficient for justification. Rather, justification requires norm conformity for sufficient undefeated reasons. An important consequence is the rejection of the claim that conformity to the norm of belief is necessary and sufficient for epistemic justification. I illustrate some interesting consequences of this result

Conformity · Epistemology · Norm (philosophy) · Religious belief · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Forgiveness and Related Behaviors · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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Velocidade de citaçãohistorical
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