Conditions for Successful Disarmament

ing insecurity in the age of rapid technological change, there is little likelihood, if statesmen continue to make policy as they have in the past, of ending that race. Lewis Richardson's simultaneous equations have demonstrated that when war is highly mechanized, arms races are more likely to end in war than in equilibrium if, as he says, statesmen do not stop to think (Richardson, 1960, pp. 12, 75; Wright, 1942, pp. 749, 1482). There seems little likelihood that guided by realists they will stop long enough to rid themselves of their obsessions. The lion, suggested Salvador Madariaga from his long experience as head of the disarmament section of the League of Nations Secretariat, wants to eliminate all weapons but claws and jaws, the eagle all but talons and beaks, and the bear all but an embracing hug (Madariaga, 1929).1 Nuclear powers will probably be unwilling to eliminate nuclear weapons, the present insignia of greatness, but will increase their capability in nuclearheaded missiles and in technical capacity to make even more destructive instruments, and may even force nonnuclear powers to reduce their security by installing weapons which will make them targets of attack

Disarmament · Greatness · Law and economics · League · Nuclear weapon · Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Wright · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · History · Law · Psychology