Dragging and Confirming

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10694653
AutoresMatthew Kotzen (0000-0003-0305-4736, autor correspondente)
Ano2012
Volume121
Fascículo1
Páginas55-93
Data de publicação2012-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditoraDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-1426364
OpenAlexW2023223828
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas23

This essay addresses the question of when evidence for a stronger claim H1 also constitutes evidence for a weaker claim H2. Although the answer “Always” is tempting, it is false on a natural Bayesian conception of evidence. This essay first describes some prima facie counterexamples to this answer and surveys some weaker answers and rejects them. Next, it proposes an answer, which appeals to the “Dragging Condition.” After explaining and arguing for its use of the Dragging Condition, the essay argues that the Dragging Condition provides a general account of, and solution to, the counterexamples with which the essay began. The essay briefly discusses the relevance of the Dragging Condition to the recently much-discussed topic of “transmission failure” in epistemology, applies the Dragging Condition to the problem of “bootstrapping” in epistemology, and discusses three important objections to the view defended in the essay

Bootstrapping (finance) · Counterexample · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Natural (archaeology) · Political science · Prima facie · Relevance (law) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science