Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question and Semantic Externalism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4352116
AutoresHelen Beebee (0000-0001-7650-3622, University of Manchester, autor correspondente)
Ano2001
Volume51
Fascículo204
Páginas356-374
Data de publicação2001-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9213.00234
OpenAlexW2064630986
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas10
Referências citadas3

Martin Davies argues that ‘limitation principles’ block the transfer of warrant from the premises of a certain kind of argument to its conclusion. The class of arguments in question includes Moore's argument for the existence of the external world, and a popular style of argument which starts from two premises that are warranted by first‐person authority and semantic externalism respectively, ending with a conclusion that does not, allegedly, admit of a priori justification. I argue that the relevant class of arguments can be shown to be unconvincing without appealing to any limitation principles, by showing that they beg the question against sceptical opponents. Principles limiting the transfer of warrant are not required in order to rebut the claim that first‐person authority and semantic externalism are incompatible

Argument (complex analysis) · Begging · Class (philosophy) · Economics · Epistemology · Externalism · Skepticism · Warrant · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science