Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10704860
AutoresMatteo Morganti (0000-0002-1456-2333, Sapienza University of Rome, autor correspondente)
Ano2011
Volume78
Fascículo5
Páginas1165-1176
Data de publicação2011-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/662258
OpenAlexW2162427750
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas6
Referências citadas24

Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic metainduction on the history of science. Some authors, however, have suggested that the preservation of structure across theory change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. Although the possibility of this latter, ‘ontic’ form of structural realism has been extensively debated, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this article, I distinguish between two arguments in favor of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature and find both of them wanting

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Ontic · Pessimism · Realism · Scientific realism · Origins and Evolution of Life · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Science and Climate Studies