The Structuralist Conception of Objects

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10705329
AutoresAnjan Chakravartty (0000-0002-5097-2217, University of Toronto, autor correspondente)
Ano2003
Volume70
Fascículo5
Páginas867-878
Data de publicação2003-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/377373
OpenAlexW2126493571
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas29
Referências citadas9

This paper explores the consequences of the two most prominent forms of contemporary structural realism for the notion of objecthood. Epistemic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, but nothing about the natures of unobservable relata whose relations define structures. Ontic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, and that there is nothing else to know—objects are useful heuristic posits, but are ultimately ontologically dispensable. I argue that structuralism does not succeed in ridding a structuralist ontology of objects

Conflation · Epistemology · Nothing · Ontic · Ontology · Realism · Structuralism (philosophy of science) · Unobservable · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History