Sentraliseringsparadokset – Hvorfor staten overtar styringen fra kommunene
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10831790 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Signy Irene Vabo (0000-0002-6438-175X, BI Norwegian Business School, autor correspondente), Rune J Sørensen (0000-0003-0375-7677, BI Norwegian Business School) |
| Ano | 2005 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 503-536 |
| Data de publicação | 2005-11-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0040-716X • E-ISSN: 1504-291X |
| Editora | Scandinavian University Press (PUBLISHER • NO) |
| DOI | 10.18261/issn1504-291x-2005-04-03 |
| OpenAlex | W2765763167 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 1 |
| Referências citadas | 15 |
The paradox of centralisation: Why national government intervenes in local government. Rune J. Sorensen and Signy Irene Vabo Most democratic systems including Norway are based on geographical representation. Since national regulations of local government are likely reduce welfare of parts of the electorate, we would expect members of the national assembly to protect the autonomy of local governments. Recent developments go against this expectation. In the Norwegian case, central authorities maintain strict control over local tax rates, they require local governments to implement more national minimum standards, and local authorities must comply with an increasing number of legal entitlements to local services. This is the centralization paradox addressed in the current article. We offer three interpretations of the puzzle. First, centralization is linked to the traditional left-right conflict. Social-democratic parties want a large public sector, and renounce local discretion to get higher public service levels in all jurisdictions. Second, centralization is a way of redistributing revenues to peripheral regions. Particularly the Labour Party has its electoral base in low-revenue districts, and use grants rather than taxes to finance local government. Centralized control over taxes is part of this scheme. Third: Neither have non-socialist parties defended local self-rule. The Conservative Party has sometimes opposed regulations on expenditures, while it has supported centralized control over local taxes to limit increases in taxation. The Progress Party advocates local tax autonomy. At the same time, it supports reforms involving legal rights to public services linked to national financing. Centralization is a side-effect from alternate coalitions of political parties, seeking a mixture of conflicting policy aims
Business · Central government · Centralisation · Decentralization · Democracy · Discretion · Economics · Local government · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Public finance · Regional autonomy · Revenue · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Finance · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies
An Essay on Fiscal Federalism
Den besværlige lokalpolitikken
Economic and political determinants of fee income in Norwegian local governments
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Federal Mandates by Popular Demand
Constitutions and Commitment
Government Performance and Political Accountability at Subnational Level
Between the Welfare State and Local Government Autonomy
Local government resource use under a centralised system of financing
Centrifugal Incentives in Multi-Candidate Elections
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,11 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2017 - 2017 (1) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 1 |