An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 11290233 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jonas Send (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, autor correspondente), Marco Serena (0000-0002-6215-9629, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance) |
| Ano | 2022 |
| Volume | 90 |
| Páginas | 102516 |
| Data de publicação | 2022-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Economic Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0167-4870 • E-ISSN: 1872-7719 |
| Editora | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102516 |
| OpenAlex | W4223902361 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 6 |
| Referências citadas | 29 |
Business · Economics · Auction Theory and Applications · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Taxation and Compliance Studies
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The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value
Fairness and the Coase conjecture
Take-it-or-leave-it offers in negotiations
| Obras citantes distintas | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,5 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2022 - 2023 (2) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 6 |