Changing Aristotle's Mind

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20045014
AutoresMartha C Nussbaum, Hilary Putnam
Ano1995
Páginas27-56
Data de publicação1995-11-09
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoCHAPTER
PeriódicoEssays on Aristotle's De Anima (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditoraOxford University PressOxford (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/019823600x.003.0004
OpenAlexW154579104
ISBN9780198236009
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas20

This essay is a response to Myles Burnyeat’s paper that attacks an interpretation of the credibility and acceptability of Aristotle’s views of the body and soul. It begins with a discussion of Aristotle’s motivating problems. An interpretation is defended against Burnyeat, which distinguishes Aristotle from both materialist reductionism, and from the Burnyeat interpretation that perceiving etc. does not require concomitant material change, and that awareness is primitive. Aristotle’s position is then defended as tenable, even in the context of a modern theory of matter

Credibility · Epistemology · Linguistics · Materialism · Reductionism · Soul · Classical Philosophy and Thought · History · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy