Aristotle on Perceptual Self-Consciousness

Aristotle’s account of perceptual self-consciousness (“perceiving that we perceive”) is typically approached as an attempt to explain how we know our own mental states. In particular, Aristotle is taken to understand perceptual self-consciousness as a function of the mind or soul’s quasi-perceptual relation to itself. I argue instead that Aristotle understands perceptual self-consciousness as the (veridical) perception that we are confronted with an external object. This is not a matter of knowing our own mental states, but of knowing that we know: in particular, of knowing that an external object is apparent to us through our sense-organs. I conclude with a discussion of Aristotle’s broader interest in perceptual self-consciousness

Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Perception · Psychoanalysis · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Neuroscience · Psychology

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