“What on Earth Is Smenkhkare?” WH‐Questions, Truth‐Makers, and Causal‐Informational Account of Reference

Although the historical‐causal picture of reference Kripke sketches in Naming and Necessity is highly influential, Kripke in fact says very little about what reference is and how it comes about. In this paper I point out that the possibility of asking WH‐questions (i.e. ‘what?’, ‘who?’, ‘which?’) about a sound or inscription pattern (e.g., what does that refer to?) shows that in case of names especially, their reference, if there is one, will be preserved by a causal‐historical chain constituted by transmissions of the (physical) patterns themselves, even in absence of language users or any linguistic intentions. I sketch out a causal‐informational theory of reference, that holds that the causal aspect of refence transmission is due to two‐factors. On the other hand there are informational chains constituted by data transmissions, on the other, also communicational rules by which speakers can interpret the data as information of something are needed. In most part the causal‐informational theory sketched in the paper can be viewed as complementing Kripke’s original causal picture. However, I will argue that Kripke's account of fixing the reference of proper names in ‘initial baptisms’ is inadequate. I will argue that most cases of seemingly fixing the reference via use of a definite description (e.g., the naming of Neptune) in fact presuppose a prior causal‐informational connection to the named object, thus essentially fixing the reference in the same way as in cases of baptism by ostension. I will further argue that in the cases that do not fall into the previous category, the baptism by definite description simply fail to fix any reference. I thus conclude that there is no such thing as fixing the reference of a proper name by definite description

Algorithm · Baptism · Causal theory of reference · Causality (physics) · Epistemology · Linguistics · Object (grammar) · Proper noun · Sketch · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation

• The Philosophy of Information

  Luciano Floridi•The philosophy of information•2011

  Incluir item

• A Mathematical Theory of Communication

  Claude E Shannon•Bell System Technical Journal•1948

  Incluir item

• Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference

  Open Access•Saul A Kripke, Saul Kripke et al.•Midwest Studies in Philosophy•1977

  Incluir item

• Ii.—on Denoting

  Bertrand Russell•Mind•1905

  Incluir item

• Minds, brains, and programs

  Open Access•John R Searle•Behavioral and Brain Sciences•1980

  Incluir item

• Frege

  Robert Buhr, Robert D Buhr et al.•Language•1983

  Incluir item

• Modalities and intensional languages

  Open Access•Ruth Barcan Marcus•Synthese•1961

  Incluir item

• Knowledge and the Flow of Information

  William P Alston, Fred I Dretske et al.•The Philosophical Review•1983

  Incluir item

• Reference and Definite Descriptions

  Keith S Donnellan•The Philosophical Review•1966

  Incluir item