Symbolic value and the limits of good‐for theory

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21364047
AutoresAaron Abma (0000-0002-7455-2006, Department of Philosophy Le Moyne College Syracuse New York USA, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Volume59
Fascículo2
Páginas542-563
Data de publicação2025-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoNoûs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12518
OpenAlexW4401160690
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas93

Good‐for theorists claim that to be valuable is to be good for someone, in the sense of being beneficial for them. Their opponents deny this, arguing that some things are good‐simpliciter: good independently of being good for anyone. In this article I argue in favor of good‐simpliciter. I appeal to the category of symbolically valuable acts, acts which seem valuable even when they do not benefit anyone and even when they are costly to the agent. I explore various strategies a good‐for theorist might pursue to address these apparently valuable acts, for example by appealing to the acts’ connection to beneficial character traits or practices, and I argue that none of these strategies succeed. Instead, I propose that the best way to understand the value of these acts involves seeing them as appropriate responses to what is good‐simpliciter, and more specifically, as ways of loving what is worthy of love

Mathematical economics · Statistics · Value (mathematics) · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History